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S O V I E T E C O N O M I C D I S I N T E G R A T I O N 
Introduction 
Many factors appear to have contributed to the recent disintegration 
and demise of the Soviet economy (and state). In this paper I examine one 
factor contributing to this process, which has not generally been emphasized 
in Western economic literature on this subject. This factor has to do with 
the sharp cutbacks in the rate of growth of Soviet investment beginning in 
the mid-1970s. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s there was increasing concern among 
Soviet economists and economic authorities about the inefficiencies with 
which the economy was operating. In the quarter century after World War 
II (and earlier), Soviet economic growth had depended on rapid infusions of 
capital, labor and other inputs, with only modest gains in productivity. As 
far as capital is concerned, this is suggested by the data from a Western 
source in Table I below. It is all but unprecedented in world economic 
history for the capital stock to grow more rapidly than output \ 
The shift to intensive economic growth - called for at the 24th Party 
Congress in 1971 — meant that in the future much more emphasis was to be 
placed on increases in efficiency and productivity, particularly through accel-
erated abandonment of existing old and obsolete assets (Val'tukh, 1970; 
Noren and Whitehouse, 1973, pp. 220-221). In this connection, it might be 
noted that official Soviet estimates put the service life of Soviet productive 
* Penn State University, Scranton Campus, Dunmore, PA (U.S.A). 
1 This unusual feature of the Soviet economy reflected not only a high proportion of 
investment in national income but also an almost unprecedented reluctance to retire old and 
obsolete captial assets. Indeed, from 1938-1955, the very existence of obsolescence under 
socialism was officially denied. (ARAKELIAN, 1938, pp. 36-41 and NEKRASOV, 1955). 
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TABLE I * 
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH, 1928-58 (in%) 
Reproducible fixed capital 
Net national product 
7.1 
4.1a 
a Late year price weights 
* Source is listed in Appendix 
equipment in industry in 1970 at 24 years, which was roughly double the 
service life of comparable US assets (TSSU, 1988, p. 298; CIA and 
DIA, 1987, p. 3). 
Two Views of the Role of Investment — Accumulators vs. Anti-accumulators 
While Soviet economists were virtually unanimous about the need for 
a switch to intensive economic growth, there were two different versions of 
what this meant with respect to the rate of growth of investment. Some 
believed that to achieve intensive growth — particularly to accelerate re-
placement with improved technology — high levels of investment had to be 
maintained2. Moreover, these economists argued that high levels of in-
vestment were by no means incompatible in the long run with rising stand-
ards of living. In fact, just the opposite. High levels of investment are 
necessary to raise living standards significantly over longer periods of time 
(Val'tukh, 1970 and Sorokin, 1973). The economists in this group — who 
favored high levels of investment — will henceforth be referred to as "Accu-
mulators" 3. 
On the other hand, there were what henceforth will be called "Anti-ac-
cumulators", who argued for significant reductions in the rate of growth of 
investment and in the share of investment in national income 4. 
' Scrappage rates are assumed to be roughly equal to replacement rates in this study. 
Official Soviet sources provided relatively comprehensive and systematic data on scrappage 
rates. Little or no systematic data ori replacement rates were published. 
3 A stronghold of the latter may have been the institute of economics of the Siberian 
division of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The economist K. Val'tukh, who is cited frequently 
in what follows, was a principal spokesman for this group. 
3 A stronghold of this group appears to have been the economic research institute of the 
Central Planning Agency (Gosplan). The economist V. Kirichenko, who is cited frequently in 
what follows, was a high-level official in this institute. While initially a principal spokesman 
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TABLE I I * 
R A T E O F G R O W T H O F S O V I E T R E A L I N V E S T M E N T A N D N A T I O N A L I N C O M E 
(by use), 1960-1975 
Years Average annual rate Average annual rate 
of growth of capital of growth of national 
investment (in constant rubles) (%) income (by use) (%) 
1960-65 6.3 5.7 
1965-70 7.6 7.1 
1970-75 7.0 5.2 
* Sources of data on the basis of which these percentage figures were calculated are listed 
in Appendix. 
The Anti-accumulators, such as V. Kirichenko, a high level planning 
official, often couched their arguments in terms of imbalances associated 
with high levels of investment. Kirichenko stressed the imbalance in the 
economy arising from significantly higher rates of growth of capital stock 
than of the labor force, with a consequent underutilization of capacities. 
According to him, in the second half of the 1970s about a quarter of new 
capital assets brought on stream (by value) were underutilized (Kirichenko, 
1970, 1975a, and 1980). These economists often argued that modern tech-
nology is frequently capital-saving, which should make it possible to reduce 
capital requirements per unit of output. Along the same lines, the Anti-accu-
mulators pointed with envy to UN data, showing that US national income in 
the 1950s and 1960s rose more rapidly than capital inputs (Pervushin and 
Prostiakov, 1971). In this connection, it might be noted that, as shown in 
Table II above, based on official Soviet data, the growth of total investment 
in the Soviet economy generally exceeded the growth of national income. 
The Anti-accumulators were at pains to show that a high rate of 
growth of consumer goods (Division B) as opposed to capital goods (Divi-
sion A) was not incompatible with Marxist-Leninist dicta (Dovgan', 1965, 
pp. 68-69; Pervushin and Prostiakov, 1971; and Miroshnikov, 1972). The 
members of this group generally seemed to associate a cut in the rate of 
growth of investment with a more rapid rise in living standards (Kirichenko, 
1975b, p. 2). 
Finally, an important position of the Anti-accumulators was that a 
for the Anti-accumulators, Kirichenko appears to have modified his views somewhat at a later 
date (KIRICHENKO, 1983). 
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cutback in investment would be accompanied by accelerated replacement, 
which would make it possible for the economy to realize the benefits of 
modern technological advances. One of the clearest explanations of this 
point of view was made by the planning official Kirichenko in 1980. Ac-
cording to him, massive new capital construction in diverse sectors of the 
economy reduced the availability of resources for replacement of existing 
capacities, thereby unduly extending the lives of the latter and rendering 
them hopelessly obsolete. Also, according to him, the excessive proliferation 
of new investment projects made it impossible to supply the material, capi-
tal and other inputs required to bring these projects on stream on schedule. 
This caused a lengthening of construction cycles and gestation periods (Kiri-
chenko, 1980). Similar arguments were advanced by another official of the 
economic research institute of the Central Planning Agency (Gosplan), D. 
Chernikov (Chernikov, 1982, p. 10). 
The argument seemed to assume that, with a slowing of the rate of 
growth of investment, imbalances and tensions allegedly created by high 
rates of growth of investment would be relieved and replacement almost 
automatically accelerated. There were no suggestions for specific measures 
to be taken by the government to redirect investment away from new 
construction or expansion to replacement, despite inbuilt biases against the 
latter. Specific measures to accelerate abandonment might have included 
such things as accelerated depreciation and special bonuses to managerial 
personnel who actually accelerated abandonment of obsolete assets (Kuren-
kov and Palterovich, 1975, p. 199; Fal'tsman, 1975, p. 194). Even more 
effective might have been the incorporation in annual and longer-term plans 
of specific replacement projects which had to be completed in order for 
production units to claim plan fulfillment5. 
Simplistic Interpretation of a Mathematical Formula 
The automatic acceleration of replacement as a result of cutting the 
rate of growth of investment — postulated by the Anti-accumulators — gives 
rise to an intriguing speculation. According to a 1988 Soviet source, some 
Soviet economists — not identified by the source — argued in the 1970s, on 
the basis of a formula developed by a Soviet scholar, la. B. Kvasha, that 
higher rates of retirement are associated with lower rates of growth of 
' A measure similar to this was incorporated in the 12th five-year plan (1986-90), with 
ini t ia l ly f a v o r a b l e resu l t s (ZHURALEV, 1988; TSYGICHKO, 1987). 
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investment and capital stock and lower rates of retirement are associated 
with higher rates of growth of investment and capital stock (Sychev, Ozhe-
gov and Borisov, 1988, p. 23) 6. A common version of the formula is as 
follows (Kvasha, 1979, p. 35): 
Kv = L  
(1 + r)< - 1 
where Kv = the rate of retirement (the ratio of abandoned assets to capital 
stock), r = the rate of growth of investment (or capital stock) and t = the 
average service life of the capital stock. 
Before proceeding further, a few historical and other details concerning 
this formula should perhaps be pointed up. The formula appears to have 
been developed by Kvasha in a work published in 1937 (Kvasha, 1937, p. 
172) 1. The Kvasha formula can be readily derived from certain of Domar's 
calculations (Domar, 1957, p. 157, n. 8 nd p. 161). Soviet sources accord-
ingly sometimes referred to this mathematical expression as the Kvasha-
Domar formula (Sychev, Ozhegov and Borisov, 1988, p. 20). Finally, it 
should be noted that the Kvasha formula is identical with what is known in 
Western finance as the "sinking fund factor" (Grant and Ireson, 1960, p. 
553). 
The interpretation of the Kvasha (or Kvasha-Domar) formula by the 
Soviet economists alluded to in the aforementioned 1988 monograph would 
be correct if - and this is a big if - the average service life of the capital 
stock were constant and independent of the rate of growth of investment. 
This can be easily verified by reference to the sinking-fund-factor in any set 
of compound interest tables. If, for example, r in the Kvasha formula goes 
from 5 % to 10% and the average service life (t) remains at 12 years, the 
retirement ratio (Kv) will go from .063 to .047 - a decline of 25% (Grant 
and Ireson, 1960, pp. 548-553). 
In fact, however, the average service life of the capital stock may not 
be independent of the rate of growth of investment (and capital stock). If 
6 Since the central planning agency (Gosplan) appears to have been an Anti-accumulator 
stronghold, it is possible that the economists alluded to here may have worked for this agency. 
7 In the 1937 Kvasha work, the mathematical formula appears to be misstated, possibly as 
a result of a typographical error, as 
I D  
i (i +/•)-•' 
In a 1959 Kvasha work the formula presented is very close to that in the 1979 Kvasha 
monograph cited above (KVASHA, 1959, p. 97). 
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the rate of growth of investment (and capital stock) slacks off - and the 
availability of resources for replacement is thereby reduced, the average 
service life of the capital stock may increase and the ratio of replacement to 
stock may decline rather than increase 8. Conversely, if the rate of growth of 
investment (and capital stock) rises and the availabilty of resources for 
replacement is thereby increased, the average service life of the capital stock 
may decrease and the ratio of replacement to stock may rise rather than 
decline 9. Thus it is possible that a simplistic interpretation of the Kvasha 
formula could have contributed to the development of the Anti-accumulator 
point of view - that a reduction in the rate of growth of investment would 
automatically accelerate the pace of replacement. 
Leadership's Adoption of the Anti-accumulator View 
In the mid-1970s, the Soviet government adopted the views of the 
Anti-accumulators, cutting the rate of growth of investment sharply (Tables 
III and IV below) 10. Some authoritative Soviet and Western economists 
believe the rates of growth of investment from 1975-1985, in both Tables 
III and IV below, overstate the actual rate, which, during at least part of 
this period, may have been negative (Val'tukh, 1982; Nove, 1987; and 
Bergson, 1987). 
Such cuts must have appeared particularly attractive to the leadership. 
This was a period when the USSR was pursuing an adventurous, expansion-
ary foreign policy abroad, buttressed by rough strategic balance with the 
US, while simultaneously seeking to raise living standards at home. Re-
sources required to accomplish these diverse purposes were very scarce 
indeed (Rush, 1982, pp. 329-330; Thomas, 1979, p. 74; Aganbegian, 
1985; and Sorokin, 1987). 
While political and strategic considerations undoubtedly played a pre-
dominant role in the decision to sharply cut back the rate of growth of 
investment, at least one other possible motivating factor should be men-
tioned. As indicated earlier, Soviet economists and economic authorities were 
envious of the fact that in Western countries, such as the US, national 
8 To anticipate future results, this appears to have been precisely what happened in the 
USSR in the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. 
' The average service life of the capital stock, it might be noted, is influenced not only by 
factors on the supply side, such as the availability of capital for replacement. Demand factors 
may also play a crucial role. 
10 Table III is based on a Western source and Table IV is based on Soviet sources. 
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TABLE I I I * 
A V E R A G E A N N U A L % G R O W T H O F N E W F I X E D I N V E S T M E N T I N A L L S E C T O R S 
O F T H E E C O N O M Y ( B A S E D O N F I G U R E S I N B I L L I O N S O F 1970 R U B L E S ) 
1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 
Total 6.4 6.8 6.2 3.4 
Machinery and equipment 10.2 7.5 8.8 6.5 
Construction and other capital 5.0 6.4 5.1 1.7 
outlays 
* Source of data on the basis of which these calculations were made is listed in Appendix. 
TABLE I V * 
A V E R A G E A N N U A L % G R O W T H O F I N V E S T M E N T I N A L L S E C T O R S O F T H E 
E C O N O M Y A N D I N D U S T R Y 
( B A S E D O N R U B L E F I G U R E S A D J U S T E D F O R P R I C E C H A N G E S ) 
1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 
All sectors 6.0 7.5 7.0 3.4 3.5 
Productive 7.4 7.6 8.0 3.5 3.2 
1 Non-productive (includes investment in 3.7 7.4 4.1 2.5 4.0 
housing, health care and the like) 
Industry 6.5 6.6 6.7 3.5 4.2 
* Source of data on basis of which these calculations were made is listed in Appendix. 
income was increasing more rapidly than investment, reflecting greater effi-
ciency in the use of capital in these countries. The sharp reductions in the 
rate of growth of investment - described by Kirichenko as a kind of strate-
gic "maneuver" - appear to have been designed in part to force Soviet 
industrial ministries and the production and construction units under their 
jurisdiction to operate more efficiently - in particular, to meet output tar-
gets without the customary excessive reliance on increased capital inputs 
(Kirichenko, 1983; Ivanov, 1991). In the absence of disciplinary market 
mechanisms — including an effective interest charge — such coercion may 
have appeared to be one of the few means available to encourage economy 
in the use of capital inputs (Senchagov, 1974, pp. 163-164; Nove, 1972, p. 
233; and Gregory and Stuart, 1989, p. 200). 
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Assessment of the Anti-accumulator Views 
Before examining the consequences of these dramatic changes in Soviet 
investment policy, based to a considerable extent on the views of the Anti-
accumulators, it is worth pausing a moment to assess the rationality of these 
views. In such an assessment, it is useful to keep in mind that the USSR 
was faced with a relatively severe, intensifying labor shortage in the mid-
1970s and 1980s (Table V below). 
TABLE V * 
A V E R A G E A N N U A L R A T E S O F G R O W T H O F L A B O R F O R C E I N S O V I E T 
E C O N O M Y A S A W H O L E A N D I N I N D U S T R Y ( % ) 
1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 
! In economy as a whole 4.4 2.1 2.5 1.9 1.0 .2 
1 In industry 4.0 2.9 1.5 1.6 .7 - 1 . 6 
* Sources of data are listed in Appendix. 
The views of the Anti-accumulators appear, to this observer, to have 
been extremely naive and ill-founded. It was a mistake to attribute some of 
the principal ills of the capital goods sector of the Soviet economy in the 
mid-1970s - long construction cycles, dissipation of investment resources 
over an excessively large number of projects, high levels of unfinished 
construction, extraordinarily retarded replacement and the like - to high 
levels of investment. The tensions and inefficiencies of the economy, in my 
opinion, were rooted in excessively centralized, taut economic planning -
with very ambitious output targets - and the absence of disciplinary market 
mechanisms. 
Rather than sharp reductions in the rate of growth of investment, the 
economy sorely needed a redirection of investment - away from new con-
struction and expansion projects to replacement and mechanization 11. Large 
" In a 1979 article, it might be noted, Abram Bergson concluded that the USSR was not 
oversaving (and hence overinvesting) as judged by Golden Rule growth requirements (BERG-
SON, 1979, p. 219). 
Some Western analysts believed that to substitute capital for labor the level of investment 
would have had to be increased, with the risk of diminishing returns (COHN, 1979, p. 232). 
However, with a significant redirection of investment toward replacement and mechanization, 
capital could have been substituted for labor without increased levels of investment and the 
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amounts of labor were tied up in repair activities because of the extraordi-
narily long service lives of Soviet fixed assets. In the early 1970s these 
activities reportedly engaged a tenth of the industrial labor force and a third 
of the contry's stock of metal-cutting tools (Schneiderov, 1975). More than 
half of Soviet industrial workers were classified as unskilled, making use of 
little or very unsophisticated equipment (Cohn, 1979, p. 235). 
Such a redirection of Soviet investment could only be made more 
difficult by significant reductions in the rate of growth of investment. Such 
cuts would reduce the availability of capital assets which could be used for 
replacement and mechanization. They would almost certainly increase the 
scarcity of capital relative to other resources. Throughout Soviet economic 
history prior to 1975, greater capital scarcity was associated with slower 
rather than more rapid replacement (Harmstone, 1988) 12. 
Even had the rate of growth of investment, however, been maintained 
- rather than sharply curtailed - this in itself would, in all probability, not 
have been sufficient to assure levels of replacement and mechanization of 
the required magnitudes. Given the Soviet bias against replacement, for 
example, specific governmental measures aimed at accelerating this activity 
would have undoubtedly been required. 
One final point should be made regarding the views of the Anti-accu-
mulators. It is axiomatic in Western economic thought that any gain in 
consumption, as a result of a cut in investment, will be very short-lived. In 
the long run, consumption will be lower than it would have been had 
investment not been cut. Put it in another way, the adverse effect on 
consumption now of a larger share of investment in national income will be 
more than offset in the long run by a more rapid growth in the overall 
economy (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1989, pp. 31-32 and p. 51). This truth 
seems to have been well understood by the Accumulators but, as suggested 
earlier, largely ignored by the Anti-accumulators (Val'tukh, 1970). 
Effects on Economy of Sharp Cuts in Investment Growth 
As indicated in Table VI below, the sharp cuts in the rate of growth of 
attendant risk of diminishing returns. This would have been particularly the case had the assets 
used for replacement been technologically improved relative to the assets being replaced. 
12 A general consensus appears to have developed in Western countries that the pace of 
replacement will vary inversely with the degree of capital scarcity - the greater the degree of 
scarcity, the slower the pace of abandonment and vice versa (SALTER, 1960, pp. 44-47). It is of 
some interest that this inverse relationship seemed to hold in a nonmarket economy such as 
that of the former USSR. 
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TABLE V I * 
A V E R A G E A N N U A L R A T E S O F G R O W T H O F N A T I O N A L I N C O M E , 
I N D U S T R I A L P R O D U C T I O N , A N D C R U D E S T E E L O U T P U T 1965-1985 ( I N P E R C E N T ) 
1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 
National income" (by use) 7.1. 5.2 3.8 2.8 
Industrial production" 8.4 7.5 4.5 3.7 
Crude steel output^ 4.9 4.1 0.9 0.9 
a All percentage figures, as far as is known, were calculated on the basis of what was called 
data in comparable (constant) prices in the former USSR. 
b Calculated on the basis of data in millions of metric tons. 
* Sources of data on the basis of which these percentage figures were calculated are listed in 
Appendix. 
investment — in line with the views of the Anti-accumulators — were accom-
panied by severe reductions in the rate of growth of important economic 
variables, including national income and industrial production. Calculations 
by an authoritative Soviet source point to a precipitous drop in the rate of 
growth of real, per capita income over the period 1975-1985. According to 
these calculations, this rate fell from 24% in the period 1971-75 to 18% in 
1976-80 to just 11% in the 1981-85 period (Ivanov, 1991). 
The pace of abandonment similarly fell off (Table VII below). The 
decline in the retirement ratio was particularly marked in the case of build-
ings and structures, presumably reflecting the steep reduction in construc-
tion outlays (Table III above). The Kvasha formula suggests that if both the 
TABLE V I I * 
S I M P L E A V E R A G E O F I N D U S T R I A L R E T I R E M E N T R A T I O S 
( % O F C A P I T A L S T O C K ) " 
Years I Total productive Machinery and Buildings and 
1 fixed assets 1 equipment 1 structures 
1971-75 1.8 2.5 1.0 
1976-80 1.4 2.4 .6 
1981-85 1.3 2.3 .4 
a Ratios from 1973 on are computed on the basis of beginning-of-year stock. It is not clear 
whether the 1971 and 1972 ratios were calculated on the basis of beginning-of-year stock or on 
some other basis (average annual capital stock, for example). 
* Sources of ratios are listed in Appendix. 
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scrappage rate and the rate of growth of investment (and capital stock) 
decline, as they did in the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s, the average 
service life of the capital stock must increase. This appears to have been 
precisely what happened in the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s. According to 
official Soviet statistics, the average service life of Soviet machinery and 
equipment in industry increased from 24.0 years in 1970 to 27.9 in 1985, 
an increase of about 16% (TSSU, 1988, p. 298) Given the steep decline 
in the scrappage ratio for buildings and structures, the increase in the 
average service life of these assets must have been much more significant14. 
Early Gorbachev Period 
Because of the poor performance of the Soviet economy over the 
period 1975-85, the Soviet leader Gorbachev, who came to power in 1985, 
launched his now famous reforms. He began by espousing the views of the 
Accumulators. He described the cutback in investment from one five-year 
plan to another as "completely unjustified". In line with this view, the 12th 
five-year plan (1986-90) called for a 23 percent rise in investment in the 
economy as a whole, which compares with a 15 percent realized increase in 
the 1981-85 period (Pravda, 1986, p. 2). 
A glance at Table VIII below shows that the rate of growth of in-
vestment did, in fact, rise sharply in the period 1985-88. The economy 
appeared to respond favorably to the increase in the rate of growth of 
TABLE V I I I * 
AVERAGE ANNUAL % GROWTH OF INVESTMENT IN ALL SECTORS 
OF THE ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY (BASED ON RUBLE FIGURES 
REPORTEDLY ADJUSTED FOR PRICE CHANGES) 1980-1990 
1980-85 1985-88 1988-90 
1 All sectors 3.5 6.7 2.6 
Productive 3.2 5.9 1.9 
Non-productive 4.0 7.4 4.7 
Industry 4.2 6.7 - .4 
* Sources of data are listed in Appendix. 
13 The methodology used to derive these estimates is not clearly spelled out by the source. 
14 No official estimates of the service life of this category of assets are available. 
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investment. As indicated in Table IX below, the rate of retirement of 
productive fixed assets in industry rose steeply 15. According to an official 
estimate, the average service life of equipment in industry fell from 27.9 
years in 1985 to 26.3 years in 1988 (TSSU, 1988, p. 298). As indicated in 
Table X, the rate of growth of industrial production held its own during this 
period, though this rate and the rate of growth of national income may have 
been significantly constrained by special factors. The latter included the 
short-term disruptive effects of an increased official emphasis on product 
TABLE I X * 
S I M P L E A V E R A G E O F I N D U S T R I A L R E T I R E M E N T R A T I O S 
( % O F B E G I N N I N G - O F - Y E A R C A P I T A L S T O C K ) 1981-1990 
Years Total productive Machinery and Buildings and 
fixed assets i equipment structures 
1981-85 1.3 2.3 .4 
1986-88 1.9 3.2 .8 
1989-90 1.6 2.6 ,7a 
a Estimate based on relationship of scrappage of buildings and structures to total indus-
trial scrappage in the period 1986-88. 
* Sources of data are listed in Appendix. 
TABLE X * 
A V E R A G E A N N U A L R A T E S O F G R O W T H O F N A T I O N A L I N C O M E , 
I N D U S T R I A L P R O D U C T I O N , A N D C R U D E S T E E L O U T P U T 1980-1990 ( I N P E R C E N T ) 
1980-85 1985-88 1988-90 
National income" (by use) 2.8 2.3 .8 
Industrial production" 3.7 4.0 .3 
Crude steel output*3 0.9 1.7 (-) .3 
a All percentage figures as far as is known, calculated on the basis of what were called 
data in comparable (constant) prices in the former USSR. 
b Calculated on the basis of data in millions of metric tons. 
* Sources of data on the basis of which these percentage figures were calculated are listed 
in Appendix. 
" In this connection, see also n. 5 above. 
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quality improvement and an anti-alcohol campaign (Gregory, 1987, p. 233:;'". 
Tremi, 1987, p. 304) 16. Real per capita income appears to have increased 
over at least part of this period (Ivanov, 1991). '" 
iM.f 
"C 
Late Gorbachev Era o ... 
V o . i 
V > . j ' 
The apparent political ascendancy of the Accumulators was, however, ' " 
short-lived. Gorbachev appears to have succumbed, over the period 198T— 
88, to the deceptively simple, politically seductive arguments of the Anti-ac-
cumulators (Kirichenko and Uvarov, 1987; Kirichenko and Uvarov, 1988). 
This was part of a more general shift of his position away from what might 
be called the traditional Soviet growth model (Ellman and Kontorovich, 
1992, pp. 15-16). The latter included heavy reliance on high levels of 
investment, ministerial prodding and pressure on managers of productive 
units for greater efficiency and strict labor discipline. Efforts to graft discipli-
nary market mechanisms on the command system were generally very muted 
indeed. 
In line with the above shift in Gorbachev's position, the government 
reassessed and sharply revised its economic policies. This change in course 
involved the redirection of investment away from productive projects pro-
vided for in the 12th five-year plan (1986-90) to nonproductive projects of 
a social overhead character - including housing - not provided for in the 
12th five-year plan. Investment was also reallocated away from heavy indus-
try and the defense sector to consumer oriented industries. This redirection 
of investment in some cases involved the mothballing of expensive produc-
tive projects, thereby seriously disrupting supply relationships (Kirichenko 
and Uvarov, 1988; Loginov, Maevskii and Mozhaiskova, 1988). Adverse 
ripple effects spread throughout the economy which, in the final analy-
sis, was still based primarily on crude input-output concepts and mecha-
nisms. Supply problems were further compounded in 1989 and 1990 by 
strikes, by enterprises asserting their new rights and refusing to fulfill con-
tractual obligations and by burgeoning nationality conflicts (Plyshevskii, 
1990). 
The upshot of all this was a sharp decline in the rate of growth of 
investment and a faltering of the economy in general. The rate of growth of 
16 Other observers have commented on the generally favorable developments in the Soviet 
economy during the initial years of the Gorbachev era (ELLMAN and KONTOROVICH, 1992 p 
15). 
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investment in industry was actually negative from 1988 to 1990 and the 
rate of growth of industrial output during this period was a negligible .3% 
(Tables VIII and X). Industrial scrappage rates also fell during this period 
(Table IX). As is well known, the USSR ceased to exist as a unified whole 
in 1991, splintering into 15 independent states. The economy, of course, 
followed suit. 
Summary and Postscript 
In sum, the beginning of the end of the Soviet economy may have 
occurred in the mid-1970s as the rate of growth of investment was sharply 
curtailed in the midst of a mounting, relatively severe labor shortage. In-
stead of utilizing capital to take the sting out of the mounting labor shortage 
through accelerated replacement and mechanization, the government aggra-
vated the problems associated with this shortage by cutting back sharply on 
the rate of growth of investment. A seductive notion that the economy 
would function more efficiently with a lower rate of growth of investment 
was accepted by the Brezhnev leadership. The latter was hard-pressed to 
find the resources required to maintain strategic parity with the US and to 
raise living standards. It is possible that a simplistic interpretation of a 
mathematical formula contributed to the decision to sharply curtail in-
vestment. 
This policy was reversed in the early years of the Gorbachev regime, 
with moderately favorable economic results. In 1988, however, Gorbachev 
seemed to revert to the short-sighted Brezhnev policy of seeking to raise 
living standards now at the expense of investment - with the well-known 
adverse, if not catastrophic, effects on the economy. 
So much for one aspect of the disintegration and eventual demise of 
the Soviet economy. Some other aspects of Soviet experience in the period 
1975-90 perhaps deserve at least brief summary comment. The close inverse 
relationship between changes in capital scarcity and replacement during this 
period is striking. The sharp cuts in the rate of growth of investment in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s - almost certainly increasing capital scarcity -
were accompanied by significant declines in the scrappage rate. The brief 
recovery in the rate of growth of investment in the period 1985-88 - when 
Gorbachev appeared to be under the influence of the Accumulators - was 
accompanied by a rise in the rate of abandonment. In the period 1988-90 -
when Gorbachev seems to have fallen under the influence of the Anti-accu-
mulators — the rate of growth of investment and the scrappage rate fell 
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significantly. According to official data, the rate of growth of investment in 
industry actually turned negative during this period. 
When, as in the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s, both the rate of 
growth of investment and national income fell sharply, it is difficult to 
disentangle cause and effect relationships. Did the fall in national income 
cause the decline in investment or the other way around? In the USSR in 
the mid-1970s the initial causal factor appears to have been the deliberate 
government decision to sharply curtail the rate of growth of investment. 
When the rate of growth of national income began to fall, as a result of this 
decision, this decline may well have reinforced the tendency for the rate of 
growth of investment to fall. In other words, a kind of mutually reinforcing 
the vicious cycle of declines in investment and national income was set in 
motion. 
A considerable literature on cyclical fluctuations in centrally planned 
economies has emerged (Ickes, 1986). It is possible that the jockeying of 
the Accumulators and Anti-accumulators for political influence contributed 
to the appearance of such fluctuations in the USSR. 
Finally, Soviet experience in the 1975-85 period suggests that caution 
should be exercised in interpreting what Soviet economists called the Kva-
sha-Domar formula or some closely related mathematical expression (Maddi-
son, 1964, p. 85). The formula suggests that, assuming the average service 
life of capital assets is unaffected, the ratio of replacement to capital stock 
will rise if the rate of growth of investment falls and vice versa. Soviet 
experience in the late 1970s and early 1980s suggests, however, that the 
assumption that the average service life of the capital stock will remain 
constant under these conditions may not hold. The slower rate of growth of 
investment will reduce the availability of resources for replacement and the 
ratio of replacement to stock, rather than rising, may decline. Any tendency 
for the ratio of replacement to capital stock to rise may be offset by a 
lengthening in the average service life of the capital stock. Similarly, an 
increase in the rate of growth of investment, rather than bringing about a 
decline in the ratio of replacement to stock, may actually raise it. Any 
tendency for this ratio to fall may be offset by a shortening in the average 
service life of the capital stock. Because of variability in the average service 
life of capital assets, predictions about the effect on the ratio of replacement 
to stock of variations in the rate of growth of investment must, as some of 
the Soviet Anti-accumulators undoubtedly discovered, be highly tentative. 
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APPENDIX 
Sources of Data Presented in Tables 
TABLE I 
Source is Campbell, 1991, p. 128. 
TABLE I I 
Source of investment data for 1960-65 is TSSU, 1965, p. 528; for 1965-70, TSSU, 1975, p. 
513 and for 1970-75, TSSU, 1980, p. 335. Source of national income data (by use) for 1965-70, is 
TSSU, 1975, p. 49 and for 1970-75, TSSU, 1980, p. 39. 
TABLE I I I 
Percentage figures calculated from data in Pitzer, 1982, pp. 66-67. 
TABLE I V 
Percentage figures calculated from data in TSSU (Goskomstat), 1987, pp. 293-295. 
TABLE V 
Percentage figures on labor force growth calculated from data in TSSU, 1965, pp. 56 and 140; 
TSSU, 1975, pp. 48 and 210; TSSU, 1982, pp. 61 and 162; TSSU (Goskomstat), 1988, pp. 37 and 
107 and TSSU (Goskomstat), 1990, pp. 8 and 386. 
TABLE V I 
Source of national income (by use) data for 1965-70 is TSSU, 1975, p. 49; for 1970-80, TSSU, 
1980, p. 39 and for 1980-85, TSSU, 1988, p. 16. Source of industrial production data for 1965-80 is 
TSSU, 1980, p. 39 and for 1980-85, TSSU, 1988, p. 5. Source of crude steel production data for 
1965-80 is TSSU, 1980, p. 158 and for 1980-85, TSSU (Goskomstat), 1988, p. 382. 
TABLE V I I 
Source of 1971 and 1972 data is Kurenkov and Palterovich, 1975, p. 42. Source of data from 
1973-85 is successive issues of the Soviet statistical yearbook (Narodnoe Khozaistvo SSSR), pub-
lished by TSSU (Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie). 1973 figure from TSSU, 1973, p. 241; 
1974 figure, TSSU, 1974, p. 205; 1975: TSSU, 1975, p. 225; 1976: TSSU, 1976, p. 190; 1977: 
TSSU, 1977, p. 137; 1978: TSSU, 1978, p. 133; 1979: TSSU, 1979, p. 159; 1980: TSSU, 1980, p. 
147; 1981: TSSU, 1981, p. 175; 1982: TSSU, 1982, p. 136; 1983: TSSU, 1983, p. 145; 1984: 
TSSU, 1984, p. 157 and 1985: TSSU, 1985, p. 124. 
TABLE V I I I 
Source of data for 1980-85 is TSSU (Goskomstat), 1987, pp. 293-295; for 1985-88, TSSU 
(Goskomstat), 1988, pp. 553-554 and for 1988-90, TSSU (Goskomstat), 1990, pp. 546 and 551. 
TABLE I X 
Source of data for 1981 is TSSU, 1981, p. 175; 1982: TSSU, 1982, p. 136; 1983: TSSU, 1983, 
p. 145; 1984: TSSU, 1984, p. 157; 1985: TSSU, 1985, p. 124; 1986: TSSU (Goskomstat), 1986, p. 
151; 1987: TSSU (Goskomstat), 1987, p. 108; 1988: TSSU (Goskomstat), 1988, p. 361; 1989: 
TSSU (Goskomstat), 1989, p. 358 and 1990: TSSU (Goskomstat), 1990, p. 380. 
TABLE X 
Source of national income (by use) data for 1980-88 is TSSU (Goskomstat), 1988, p. 16 and 
for 1988-90, TSSU (Goskomstat), 1990, p. 13. Source of industrial production data for 1980-88 is 
TSSU (Goskomstat), 1988, p. 5 and for 1988-90, TSSU (Goskomstat), 1990, p. 5. Source of crude 
steel production data for 1980-88 is TSSU (Goskomstat), 1988, p. 382 and for 1988-90, TSSU 
(Goskomstat), 1990, p. 398. 
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LA DISINTEGRAZIONE ECONOMICA SOVIETICA 
Molti fattori hanno indubbiamente contribuito alla recente disintegrazione 
e crollo dell'economia sovietica. Questo articolo si concentra su un fattore: i 
drastici tagli negli investimenti a partire dalla metà degli anni settanta. Si sostie-
ne che questi tagli hanno esacerbato problemi già esistenti connessi a una crescen-
te e abbastanza grave scarsità di lavoro. Viene qui ipotizzato che una semplicistica 
interpretazione di una formula matematica sviluppata da uno studioso sovietico 
può aver contribuito alla decisione di ridurre drasticamente gli investimenti. Ad 
ogni modo, si mostra che la fine dell'economia sovietica può essere iniziata sin 
dalla metà degli anni settanta quando si ebbe il brusco calo della spesa per 
investimenti. 
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 42 (1995), N. 5, 357-370 
M O N O P S O N Y A N D T H E P R O P E R L Y D E V I S E D M I N I M U M 
W A G E : A R E E X A M I N A T I O N 
by 
JOHN K. WATSON * 
1. Introduction 
The effects of a minimum wage, enacted by either legislation or a 
monopoly union, on a monopsony employer are illustrated in many papers 
and textbooks E It is generally accepted that a properly devised minimum 
wage can increase both wages and employment by the firm. However, very 
little theoretical research has appeared that illustrates the effects of a mini-
mum wage on industry wide employment when each firm in the industry 
enjoys monopsony power, but sells its product in a competitive market. 
The traditional analysis of monopsony employment by the firm as-
sumes that the firm is the sole employer of labor, yet it sells its product in a 
purely competitive market. The classic example of monopsony is a firm, 
such as a coal mining company or a textile mill, that establishes a plant in a 
remote or isolated area where the costs of labor transportation are high. 
Under these circumstances, the firm enjoys monopsony rents and pays a 
wage that is less than the marginal revenue product of labor. It is assumed 
that no new firms enter the area to compete for the relatively low cost labor 
and that monopsony rents are not transferred to the land owners. 
Given these conditions a properly devised minimum wage, i.e. a mini-
mum wage that forces the employer to pay a wage equal to the marginal 
revenue product of labor, will increase employment by the firm. The 
increase in employment however is subject to the condition of non-negative 
profits. If monopsony rents are necessary for the survival of the firm, then a 
* Department of Economics and Finance, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, 
LA (U.S.A.). 
1 See for example BLOOM (1941), MAURICE (1974), MARSHALL and BRIGGS (1989), MCCON-
NELL a n d BRUE (1992) , o r WACHTEL (1992) . 
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minimum wage will result in no employment at all due to the failure of the 
firm. 
The traditional analysis requires that the monopsony firm be viewed in 
one of two ways: either the monopsony firm is unique in its competitive 
product industry and no other firms enjoy monopsony power, or the monop-
sony firm is also a monopolist in its product market. In the former (and 
most often cited) case, enacting a minimum wage on the monopsony firm 
has no effect on the product price, since a single firm is affected, also the 
effect on employment in the industry is negligible and is exclusive to the 
single monopsony firm. The traditional analysis fails to consider an alterna-
tive view of monopsony — a competitive product industry in which many or 
all firms in the industry have some monopsony power in their individual 
labor markets. This view of monopsony, which has been mentioned by 
Robinson (1969) and Call and Holahan (1983), may more accurately depict 
the market circumstances that exist in the textile, coal, steel, automotive, or 
other industries. The more traditional view of monopsony and the properly 
devised minimum wage fails to analyze the impact of a minimum wage on 
industry wide employment. 
The lack of theoretical analysis in this general area may be due to the 
fact that some economists believe that there is very little monopsony power 
in labor markets, especially since the company town and labor immobility 
seem to be things of the past. However, recent work has pointed to monop-
sony power in some markets such as professional sports and nursing 2. 
Furthermore, if one chose to take an extreme view one could say that 
monopsony power exists in any market where wages are determined by 
bargaining between an employer (or an association of employers) and union 
leaders. After all, wage bargaining necessarily implies that neither the em-
ployers nor the employees are wage takers and that bilateral monopoly 
exists to some degree. 
Given that some monopsony power may exist, it is important to deter-
mine under what conditions a legislated or union imposed minimum wage 
will increase or decrease industry wide employment when firms in the 
industry sell their product in competitive markets. It is clear that a mini-
mum wage will increase the cost of production for firms in an industry and 
that a zero profits equilibrium before and after the minimum wage imposi-
tion requires that some firms fail. As Joan Robinson pointed out, when the 
level of employment per firm rises and the number of firms in an industry 
2 See LINK a n d LANDON (1975) a n d SCULLY (1974) . 
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decreases due to a minimum wage, the net effect on industry wide em-
ployment is difficult to determine. She suggests (1969, p. 299): 
... unless the physical productivity of labor is much reduced, the amount of 
employment at the higher wage will be less than at the lower wage. It is therefore 
only in the unlikely case where physical productivity falls to a sufficient extent to 
compensate for the reduction in output that it is possible to impose a minimum 
wage without causing unemployment... \ 
Attempts to quantify the effects of a minimum wage on industry em-
ployment when firms have monopsony power have failed to appear. 
However, a series of articles in the American Economist attempts to refute 
and/or support Mrs. Robinson's position through graphical analysis 4. In 
one of these articles, Gramm and Ekelund (1968, p. 80) suggest: 
Whether a minimum wage raises or lowers industry employment depends on 
the relative strengths of the production and factor substitution effects. These 
effects in turn depend on the elasticity of demand for output, ,the marginal rate of 
technical substitution between labor and capital, and the ratios of the marginal 
factor costs of labor and capital, respectively. Parameters must be specified before 
the effects of the establishment of a minimum wage in a monopsonistic industry 
can be assessed and made determinant. 
Also, Milton Friedman recognized the nature and complexities of the 
properly devised minimum wage, but rather than pursuing a theoretical 
framework of monopsony and the minimum wage he admonishes the use of 
(federally imposed) minimum wage as a policy tool with the following 
statement (1976, p. 193): 
It is perhaps worth noting explicitly that this case is little more than a 
theoretical curiosum and cannot be regarded as of any great practical importance. 
This is partly because significant degrees of monopsony are particularly unlikely to 
occur for factors of the kind affected by minimum wages rates, ... 
Professor Friedman's view of a national minimum wage policy on 
unskilled labor is understandable since monopsony is not prevalent in that 
market and a properly devised minimum wages is difficult to institute. 
However, brushing aside the whole theory of the impact of minimum wages 
on monopsony employment is unadvisable. The impact of a legislated mini-
' CALL and HOLAHAN (1983) also suggest that the change in industrial unemployment 
after a minimum wage is indeterminate under similar conditions. 
4 See FALERO (1966) , GRAMM a n d EKELUND (1968) , a n d YATES a n d TAYLOR (1967) . 
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mum wage on monopsony is identical to a union imposed wage standard. 
From this standpoint, a cogent analysis of minimum wages, monopsony, and 
industrial employment is long overdue. 
Robinson (1969), Call and Holahan (1983), and Gramm and Ekelund 
(1968) all suggest that the effect on industry employment is indeterminate. 
Robinson suggests that the change in employment depends upon the margi-
nal product of labor while Gramm and Ekelund suggest that it depends 
upon the elasticity of product demand and factor substitution effects. 
However, neither provides a rigorous analysis of industrial employment nor 
do they suggest that elasticity of labor supply has any influence on em-
ployment. Given the potential impact of union or state imposed wage poli-
cies on industrial employment, it is imperative that a trenchant theoretical 
examination be undertaken. 
In an effort to determine the effects of a minimum wage in a competi-
tive industry filled with monopsonistic firms, a model that includes elasticity 
of product demand, elasticity of marginal revenue product and elasticity of 
labor supply should yield greater insight than any found in the literature to 
date. The model that follows incorporates these concepts. 
2. The Model 
Consider an industry in which all firms are identical and each firm is 
located in its own isolated area. The supply of labor to each firm is upward 
sloping and the same for each firm in each location. New firms may enter 
the industry at new isolated locations and achieve the same monopsony 
power as all existing firms. This assumes that no two firms' labor market 
areas overlap so that the demand for labor at any location does not increase 
as new firms enter. 
Under these circumstances, if the price of nonlabor resources is con-
stant, then the industry is subject to constant cost in spite of the fact that 
the supply of labor is upward sloping to each firm. Any number of firms 
may enter the industry with no change in the average cost curve for any firm 
since the cost conditions and labor supply for each firm may be duplicated 
for an undefined number of locations. Further, if the total cost of transport-
ing the product to market is zero or identical for all firms, then a zero 
profits competitive equilibrium will be achieved. If profits exist, product 
5 Since monopsonists do not have labor demand curves, the elasticity of marginal product 
is used here as a substitute for the concept of labor demand elasticity. 
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price will fall, as the result of entry, until all firms break even regardless of 
the monopsony power of each firm. 
Let each firm's production function take the following form: 
(1) q = — — I L " + 1 for ( - 1 < a < 0) 
a + 1 
where q is the firm's output, L is the level of employment, and a is constant. 
This production function is a modification of the Cobb-Douglas form with 
labor as the only variable input6 . Marginal product is: 
(2) MP = ^- = La where — = aL«" 1 < 0 
dL dL 
Since a is a negative fraction, diminishing returns exist at all levels of 
employment. This particular functional form results in a constant elasticity 
of marginal product equal to: 
„ MP dL 1 
( 3 ) EM = - T -7T7¿ = -
L dMP a 
Let the supply of labor to each firm be upward sloping and take the 
form: 
(4) W = iß where 0 < ß < °° 
With W equal to the wage, the elasticity of labor supply, EL, is constant for 
any value of ß and equal to l/ß. Total labor cost is the wage rate times the 
level of employment: 
(5) TLC=WL = L<3 + 1 
It follows that marginal labor cost to the firm is: 
(6) MLC = (ß + 1 ) 1 / 
All nonlabor costs are fixed and equal to F. Total costs are, therefore, labor 
cost plus fixed cost: 
(7) TC = 1 / + 1 + L 
6 Although this is a short-run production function, the essential differences between the 
short and long run can be captured in the value of a, i.e., the value of a can be lower in the 
long run than in the short run if one suspects that capital substitution may occur. Also, it is 
impossible to derive a firm's long-run demand for labor if it sells its product in a competitive 
market. 
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Let industry demand for the product also have constant elasticity (e) 
and take the form: 
(8) Q = F 
where Q is industry output and P is product price. This allows for a 
downward sloping demand curve with any desired elasticity. 
3. Monopsony 
Under these circumstances the zero profits equilibrium level of em-
ployment with no minimum wage can easily be determined. The fixed costs 
and rising marginal cost result in the typical U-shaped average total cost 
curve (ATCM) as illustrated in Ligure 2. Since the costs of production are 
identical at each of the separate locations and for any number of firms, the 
industry supply is subject to constant cost. As firms enter or leave the 
industry, the labor supply for each firm does not change. Consequently, 
industry supply is infinitely elastic at the price that coincides with the firm's 
minimum average cost as shown in Figure 1. Equating marginal cost and 
Price 
QC V 
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2 
average cost as functions of labor yields the equilibrium level of em-
ployment per firm. In the monopsony case, the marginal cost of production 
is equal to marginal labor cost (6) divided by marginal product (2): 
MCM = 
MLC _ (ß + 1) 1/ (ß + 1)1/-« 
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Average cost is total cost (7) divided by the firm's output (1): 
-TV"1 jr ß + 1 i p 
(10) ATC = — = — L-JL = (A + 1 ) ( I / + 1 + D L - « - 1 
Í 1 pa + 1 
a + 1 
The zero profits equilibrium output for the firm occurs where MC = ATC. 
Since MC and ATC are functions of L, the equilibrium level of employment, 
L*M may be found by equating (9) and (10). 
(11) (ß + 1 )lß~a = (a + 1)(L" + 1 + F) L - « - 1 
(12) = [(a + l ) T O - « ) ] l / ( / J + 1) 
After determining the level of employment per firm, the industry wide level 
of employment can be found by multiplying L*M times the number of firms 
in the industry. The number of firms in the industry is equal to industry 
output divided by output per firm since all firms are identical. Substituting 
VM from (12) into the firm's production function (1) yields q*u the equilib-
rium output per firm: 
a + 1 
(13) <4 = _ J _ [ ( a + l ) F / ( ß - a ) ] ß + 1 
a + 1 
The industry output can be found by substituting either equilibrium 
marginal costs or average cost for price in the industry demand equation. 
Substituting V u into the marginal cost function (9) yields the equilibrium 
price: 
ß-g 
( 1 4 ) MC*m= (ß + l ) [ ( a + 1) F/(ß - a ) / + 1 
Substituting (14) for price in the industry demand equation yields the 
equilibrium industry output: 
eß-ca 
(15) Qm = (ß+ 1 ) £ [ ( « + l)F/(ß-a)]ß + 1 
The equilibrium number of firms in the industry, N*M, is equal to 
Qm divided by qM, or 
eß - ea - a -1 
(16) N*M — = (a + 1) (/? + 1)£ [(a + 1) F/(ß - a)] ß + 1 
Im 
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The equilibrium number of firms (16) times the level of employment 
per firm (12) is equal to the total level of employment in the industry: 
eß-ea-a 
(17) N*M L*m = {a + !)(/? + IT [(a + 1 ) F/(ß - a)] ß + l 
4. Minimum Wage 
Under the same market demand, labor supply, and production condi-
tions, a properly devised minimum wage can increase the level of em-
ployment per firm. Enacting a minimum wage will also increase equilibrium 
average cost and thus price and shift marginal revenue product upward 
(MRPM to MRPC in the figure). A minimum wage that maximizes em-
ployment per firm will occur at the point where the new marginal revenue 
product curve intersects the labor supply (see Figure 3) 7 . Under these 
conditions the marginal labor cost equals the labor supply price: 
(18) MLCc = — w = ]_ß c dL 
The firm's marginal cost8 is equal to the wage divided by marginal 
product: . -
(19) M Q = — = - = 
c MP La 
The firm's average total cost is total cost divided by output: 
(20) ATCC= L ß + 1 + F = (G + i ) ( L / ? + i + F)L-A-I 
1 ja + 1 
a + 1 
' An omniscient regulator (or union official) could discern the wage that maximizes 
employment per firm, otherwise the wage could evolve through trial and error. Also, note that 
the employment maximizing minimum wage is equal to the wage that would exist if this were 
a competitive market. 
8 The marginal cost and marginal labor cost curves actually have gaps in them. At the 
equilibrium levels of output and employment, q'c and L*c in the figure, either of the two 
functions for each can be used to determine the desired values. Also, the average total cost 
curve has a kink in it at q*c- For our purposes here, according to Figure 2 and 3, we use 
Wc for marginal labor cost, MCç for marginal cost, and ATC¡^ for average cost. 
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FIGURE 3 
At the new equilibrium output MCc equals ATCc and thus the equilib-
rium level of employment with the minimum wage, L*c> can be determined 
by equating (19) and (20): 
l 
(21) L * c = [(a + l)F/-a]ß + 1 
From this equilibrium level of employment, the firm's output, the product 
price, the industry output, the number of firms, and the industry-wide level 
of employment can be determined under the minimum wage conditions. 
Substituting L*c into the production function yields the firm's equilib-
rium level of output, q*c: 
a + 1 
(22) q*c= [ l / ( a + l ) ] [ a + l ) F / - a / + 1 
Equilibrium marginal cost and price may be found by substituting 
V c into equation (19): 
ß-a 
(23) MCc = .[(«+ 1) F/- a]1 
' + 1 
Industry output is found by substituting MC*c for price in the industry 
demand equation: 
eß-ea 
(24) Qc= [(a + l)F/-a]ß + l 
The equilibrium number of firms, N*c, is equal to Qc/q*c 
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sß-ca-a-1 
(25) N * c = ( a + 1 ) [ ( « + l)F/-a] ß + 1 
The industry-wide level of employment is equal to the number of firms, 
N*c, times the level of employment per firm, L"c: 
eß-ea-a 
(26) N*CL*C = (a + 1) [(a + 1) F/- a ] ß + 1 
Comparison of Employment. - Since industrial employment under the two 
conditions are expressed as functions of the unknown parameters, a compari-
son may yield the conditions under which the level of employment rises, 
falls, or remains constant with the imposition of the minimum wage. For 
illustration, assume that the level of industrial employment before the mini-
mum wage, equation (17), is greater than industrial employment after the 
minimum wage, equation (26): 
eß—ea — a 
(27) (a + 1) (ß + 1)£ [(a + 1) F/(ß - a)] ß + 1 
sß-ea-a 
> (a + l)[(a + 1 ) F/— a] ß + 1 
This reduces to 
(28) 
Since 
(29) - ^ + 1 > 0 + 1 > 1 for — l < a < 0 , / ? > 0 
a 
the value of the exponential in (28) is crucial in determining the inequality 
and thus the impact of the minimum wage on employment. In particular, an 
exponential value greater than one is a sufficient condition to prove that the 
inequality holds. On the other hand, a negative exponential would be suffi-
cient ta, disprove the hypothesis. However, the value of the exponential is 
strictly less than one, which is not sufficient information to determine the 
inequality. This of course suggests that the effect of the minimum wage on 
industry-wide employment cannot be logically determined unless the values 
eß-ca-a 
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TABLE 1 
R E S T R I C T E D V A L U E S O F ß T H A T R E S U L T I N D E C R E A S E D E M P L O Y M E N T 
F O R V A R I O U S V A L U E S O F E 
E = — 2.95 ct = - 0.333 ß > 0 . 5 
E„ = - 2.95 Em=-3 El< 2 
E = — 1 a = - 0.333 ß > 1 
Ed = - 1 EM = - 3 El< 1 
E • 0.522 a = - 0.333 ß >2 
Ed = - 0.522 Em=~ 3 El < 0.5 
TABLE 2 
R E S T R I C T E D V A L U E S O F E T H A T R E S U L T I N D E C R E A S E D E M P L O Y M E N T 
F O R V A R I O U S V A L U E S O F A 
a = - 0.078 ß = 1 E <- 0.137 
Em = - 12.82 El= 1 ed<- 0.137 
a = — 0.333 ß = 1 E <- 1 
em = - 3 El= 1 ED<- 1 
a = — 0.4766 ß = 1 E <- 1.9 
Em = ~ 2.98 EL = 1 Ed<- 1.9 
TABLE 3 
RESTRICTED VALUES OF a THAT DECREASE EMPLOYMENT 
FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF ß 
ß = 0 . 5 £ = — 1 a > - 0.0758 
El = 2 Bd = - 1 E M < - 13.186 
ß = 1 £ = — 1 a > - 0.333 
El= 1 Ed = - 1 E A Í < ~ 3 
J® = 2 £ = — 1 a > - 0.4766 
El = 0.5 £ d = - 1 EM < - 2.098 
of a, ß, and e are specified 9. The tables above illustrate a simulation of 
possible values of the parameters that lead to a decrease in employment 
when the minimum wage is imposed. 
In Table 1, for example, for given elasticities of marginal product 
' It is interesting to note that if the minimum wage (which results in optimal labor 
employment, i.e. W = MRP) decreases industry employment, then the monopsony power 
causes an over-allocation of labor rather than an under-allocation. 
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(EM = - 3) and product demand (ED = - 2.95) a particular restricted 
value of labor supply elasticity (EL < 2) exists that results in a fall in 
employment following the imposition of a minimum wage. Also, from 
Table 1, as the elasticity of demand for the product falls, the less elastic the 
supply of labor must be for employment to fall. Conversely, the more elastic 
the supply of labor, the less inelastic the product demand needs to be in 
order for the level of employment to fall10. 
In Table 2, for a given elasticity of labor supply, the less elastic the 
marginal product, the more elastic the product demand needs to be in order 
for the minimum wage to decrease employment. Conversely, the less elastic 
the product demand, the more elastic the marginal product needs to be in 
order for employment to fall. Table 3 shows that the less elastic the supply 
of labor, the less elastic the marginal product needs to be in order for the 
minimum wage to decrease employment. 
The simulated values illustrate that employment is more likely to fall 
following the minimum wage if product demand or marginal revenue prod-
uct are elastic or if labor supply is inelastic. One would suspect that 
product demand and the firm's marginal revenue product are most elastic in 
the long run. Thus, the minimum wage would be more detrimental to 
employment in the long run. On the other hand, it is interesting that the 
lower the elasticity of labor supply the more likely industry employment 
will fall when a minimum wage is imposed. If a firm's degree of monopsony 
power is inversely related to its labor supply elasticity, then the greater the 
monopsony power in the industry, the more likely a minimum wage will 
cause employment to fall. 
Conclusion 
When legislation or a union imposes an industry-wide minimum wage 
on firms that possess monopsony power in labor markets, but sell their 
products in a competitive market, the level of employment per firm will rise 
and the number of firms will decrease. According to the model presented 
here, the level of employment in the industry will rise or fall depending on 
the elasticities of marginal product, product demand, and labor supply. In 
particular, if the marginal product or the product demand are sufficiently 
10 Substituting zero for ß in equation (28) making the labor supply infinitely elastic shows 
that a minimum wage equal to the competitive wage has no effect on employment in the 
absence of monopsony power. 
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elastic, or the labor supply is sufficiently inelastic, the total level of em-
ployment will fall. The traditional model of monopsony fails to consider the 
impact of wage policies on the total number of firms in an industry and 
therefore the level of industrial employment. Before a legislated or union 
imposed minimum wage can be offered as a boon to labor in monopsony 
labor markets, the degree of competition in the product market and the 
parameters determining the relevant elasticities must be assessed. 
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MONOPSONIO E SALARIO MINIMO OPPORTUNAMENTE ASSEGNA-
TO: UNA RICONSIDERAZIONE 
L'analisi tradizionale del mercato del lavoro monopsonistico suggerisce che 
un salario minimo opportunamente assegnato aumenta l'occupazione. Questo mo-
do di vedere è corretto quando l'unica impresa gode di una posizione sia di mo-
nopsonio sia di monopolio. Tuttavia, se l'impresa è solo una delle tante imprese 
monopsonistiche che vendono i loro prodotti in un mercato di concorrenza, 
l'approccio tradizionale non è corretto perché non considera l'influenza del sala-
rio minimo sul prezzo del prodotto, sulla produzione e l'occupazione industriale. 
Il modello teorico qui presentato suggerisce che anche con un salario minimo op-
portunamente assegnato l'occupazione industriale può diminuire. Le variazioni 
dell'occupazione dipendono dalle elasticità della domanda del prodotto, del rica-
vo marginale, e dell'offerta di lavoro. 
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 42 (1995), N. 5, 371-382 
P Y R A M I D D E C I S I O N STRUCTURES: F U R T H E R I N S I G H T S 
by 
MARIO S. CATALANI * 
1. Introduction 
In a previous paper (Catalani and Clerico, 1993) we defined a decision 
structure, called a pyramid decision structure, with the following character-
istics. The structure is composed by a series of levels each of them made out 
of a number of elements not greater than that of the level immediately below. 
Now let the decision to be made be of a dichotomous type, for example to 
accept or to reject a project. Then each level behaves as a polyarchy, that is 
the level accepts the project if at least one of its members accepts it. 
Furthermore the levels among them act as a hierarchy, that is the whole 
structure accepts the project if all the levels accept it. As a matter of 
convention, let the bottom level be that with the greatest number of ele-
ments and the top level that with the lowest number. Given N, the total 
number of components of the structure, and k, the number of levels, we 
have different possible configurations of the pyramid, depending on the 
distribution of the members across the levels. We introduced a quasi-lexico-
graphic ordering of configurations which was identified with a sort of a law 
of evolution from an originary configuration. The originary configuration is 
characterised by having each level, with the exception of the bottom, 
containing just one element. Then this law of evolution can be stated in thé 
following way: from each configuration the next one is obtained through a 
movement of one unity from the bottom level to that immediately above, if 
it is possible (that is, if the resulting configuration is still a pyramid). If it is 
not, through a movement of one unity from the second level to the third 
one, if it is possible... and so on. We start from the originary configuration 
* Department of Economics, University of Turin (Italy). 
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and when we reach a configuration that does not allow further movements 
we say that we reached the stable configuration. 
To make things clearer we formalize in this way. A configuration of 
the pyramid, given N and k, to be indicated with co (N, k), is a set of k 
numbers: {«x, n2, ..., nk}, such that 
k 
X n¡ = N, «! > «2 > ... > nk (1) 
< = i 
That is to say: the first number of the set is the number of elements 
of the bottom level, the last one that of the elements of the top level, and 
generally the z'-th number is the number of elements of the z'-th level, 
1 < i < k. The originary configurations is 
co0(N, K) = {N - k + 1, 1, ..., 1, 1} 
Even though the present model moves, and borrows terminology, from 
contributions of Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986, 1988, 1991), we have to 
underline the originality of the developments presented in this paper. This 
decision structure seems to fit particularly well research institutions, for 
instance the Italian University as presently organized in three levels. The 
project that has to be discussed might be envisaged as a research paper: it is 
then sufficient that one member of a level consider this paper not manifestly 
bad to pass it to a successive level for further evaluation. But only the 
approval of all the levels can authorize the publication. In this way it is 
justified the assumption of a polyarchy within the levels and of a hierarchy 
between the levels. The aim of this paper is to study in details some 
characteristics of a decision structure of this kind: mainly how different 
distributions of the members across the levels affect the quality of the made 
decision and the time spent to reach the decision. 
2. A New Recursive Formula for the Numbers of Configurations 
In the cited paper (Catalani and Clerico) it was given a formula to 
calculate, given N and k, the number of resulting configurations. Let us 
call this number v (N, k). We are going to give here a new formula, in a 
recursive form, which is more readily understood. Let us say that the num-
bers N are regular if 
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Given a regular N and k, let us define the non-negative integer m in 
such a way as to satisfy 
mk + 1 + M_±_A1 < N < (m + I) k + M + J ) 
Let us define 
2 ^ IV ^ (w + i j ¿ + ———-—— m> o 
* = - M I L ) , Í - 0 H . 
Then 
V (N + 1, /È) = 
with 
'v(N, k) + k - 2 - 8 if í < k - 2 
V (N, k) + k - 1 if 8 = k — 1 
v * ) = <Pk + k - 1 
where Nm is the minimum value of N, that is 
Nm = 1 + M ± i l 
2 
and 
„ = ! + 2 f ( f - J f - 2 ) 
12 
3. A Formula for Determining the Stable Configuration 
rb ,Nk,W W e f a r e g O Ì n g t 0 e s t a b l i s h t h e f o r m u I a t h a t allows to write down 
the stable configuration tu, (N, k) when we start with the originary c o n f i 
ration and follow the evolution described above. If 8 
N = Ü Í ± i l 
we say that 
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Cüs (N, k) = {k, k - 1, k - 2, ..., 3, 2, 1} (*) 
The reason for this result is the following. First of all, since this is the 
stable configuration, each two adjoining levels must differ at most of one 
element. Secondly, each configuration cannot contain more than one couple 
of adjoining levels with the same composition (unless the other couple is 
made out of ones); in the same line each configuration cannot contain a 
triple of adjoining levels with the same composition, and so on. "Cannot 
contain" means that such a configuration cannot be found in the dictionary. 
To show this fact let us assume that indeed there exists such a configura-
tion, for example a configuration with two couples of adjoining levels with 
the same composition (and none of them made out of ones). Then we 
should be able moving back in the dictionary to trace back the genetic 
history of this configuration. What really happens is that we find as an 
ancestor of this configuration a configuration which is not a pyramid. For 
example, let this configuration be {5, 5, 4, 3, 2, 2}. Then moving back a 
step at a time we might have this sequence: {6, 4, 4, 3, 2, 2}, {6, 5, 3, 3, 2, 
2}, {7, 4, 3, 3, 2, 2}, {8, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2}, {9, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2}, which is not a 
pyramid. It follows that necessarily the configuration (*) is the stable config-
uration. 
Now suppose that 
N = k(k+1) + 1  
2 
Then the same reasoning as before allows us to conclude 
cos(N, k) = { k , k - l , k - 2, ..., 3, 2, 2} 
Continuing in this way we obtain the general formula: let 
2 
Clearly, p is an integer. Then we can write 
p = rk + s s<k r> 0 
The stable configuration can be written in this way 
u, (N, k) = {k + r, k + r - 1, k + r - 2, ..., r + s + 2, r + s + 1, 
r + J + 1, r + r, ..., 4 + r, 3 + r, 2 + r) 
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where the couple with identical values r + s + 1 corresponds to the levels 
s-th and (s + l)-th descending from the top level, that is going backward 
from the last element of the previous list. It is just a little bit more 
complicated to get the formula in the case ft < 0. In this case we can 
determine i in such a way that 
it - i i i ± j ) < A J A ± J 1 _ M < ,.• + „ k ( / + ! ) ( , +2) 
2 2 2 
where i = 0, 1, .... k - 2. Let us call i* the value of i so determined Let 
us put 
M ± j ) - J V - ^ + '•*(/* + 1) 
2 2 
Then we have 
w, (N, k) = {k - i* - 1, k - i* - 2, k - i* - 3, ..., k - i* - t, 
k - i* - t, k - i* - t - 1, ..., 1, 1} 
where the couple having the same value k - i* - t corresponds to the 
levels t-th and U + l ) - t h ascending from the bottom level, that is moving 
forward from the first element of the previous list, while the string of ones 
begins at the (i* + 1 )-th level starting from the last element 
4. The Probability to Accept a Good Project 
We make the following assumptions on the individual behavior. All 
the members possess the same probability p to make the right decision, and 
they are independent among them. To simplify matters let us assume that 
the project under scrutiny is good: then pAs the individual probability to 
accept the project. In the cited paper it was proved that, with N = 10 and 
k - 3, the quasi-lexicographic ordering of configurations was consistent 
with an increasing ordering of the probabilities to accept the project (i e to 
make the right decision), that is, moving ahead in the dictionary of configu-
rations the probability to accept the project increases. Here we are going to 
generalize this result for arbitrary N and k. The evolution law from the 
originary configuration, as described, means that we have the sequence 
(1) «! decreases, n2 increases, «3 is constant, ..., nk is constant, 
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(2) »! is constant, n2 decreases, «3 increases, ..., nk is constant, 
(3) nx is constant, n2 is constant, »3 decreases, ..., nk is constant, 
again (1), (2), (3), ..., until reaching the stable configuration 
Remark. The last configuration of each group is the first of the following 
group. . 
Let us consider any two consecutive configurations of the group (1). 
Let Pn and P2 1 be the corresponding probabilities. Then, for some r, and 
writing q = 1 - p 
pn = (1 - q"i - 0(1 - q"2 + r ) d - (1 - l"k) 
P21 = (1 - ~r - »Kl - q"i + r + 1)( 1 - q"}) - d -
Then, using the result given in the Appendix, 
(1 - - 0 ( 1 - q"2 + r) < (1 - q " 1 " - ')(! -q"2 + r + 1) 
and so 
Pu < P21 
Now let us consider any two consecutive configurations of the group 
(2). Let Pn and P22 be the corresponding probabilities. Then, for some rv 
r2> r i 
P12 = (1 - q"i - - q"2 + r2)(l - qn> +r3) .... (1 - <?"*) 
P22= (1 -q"2 + r2-lX1 + 
Then, using again the result in the Appendix, 
(1 _ q"2 + '2)(1 - q»> + '3) < (1 - q"2 + '2 " 0(1 - q"} +r> + 1) 
and so 
P12 < P 22 
Repeating the same argument for all the groups and using the Remark 
we can conclude that the. probability is strictly increasing moving ahead in 
the dictionary. 
5. The Expected Number of Evaluations 
Now we want to give a formula to evaluate the expected number of 
PYRAMID DECISION STRUCTURES 3 7 7 
evaluations in a pyramid with N members and k levels. As usual 
»! > «2 > ... > nk 
Let T be the number of evaluations of the structure. Let us denote 
with T, the number of evaluations at level i. Furthermore, let A¿ denote the 
event "the z-th level accepts the project", and A\ the event "the z'-th level 
does not accept the project". Then 
E[T] = E [TJ IA\] PZ [ACJ] + [E [TJAJ] + E [ R 2 | A | ] ] Pr [Alt A\] 
+ ÍEÍTMiÍ + E[T2\A2] + E [T3IA3]] Pr[Alf A2, A$] 
+ [BdilAJ + L[t2|A2] + ...+ E + E[rk]] 
• Pr[Alt A2, ..., Ak_J 
Using the independence among levels, rearraging the terms and using 
properties of the conditional expected value, this expression can be simpli-
fied to 
E[T] = E [tj] + E [ r 2] Pr [At] + E [r3] Pr [Ax] Pr [A2] + ... 
+ E[rk] Pr [Aj] Pr[A2] i -- Pr[Ak _ 
where 
E U,] = Pr[A,] = 1 - q»> 
1 — a 
6. Superiority of the Extreme Configurations 
We are going to prove that as far as the expected number of evalua-
tions is concerned the first (originary) and the last (stable) configurations 
are superior, in the sense that there exists a value p* such that V p < p* 
the stable is the best and V p > />* the originary is the best. W e speak of 
superiority since the expected number of evaluations can be considered as a 
measure of the time spent in reaching the decision and we would like to 
minimize this time. We are going to prove this for k = 2 and for N even, 
but numerical analysis shows that the same result holds for k > 2 and 
any N. In the analysed case it is easy to see that the number of configura-
tions is v = —. Let us denote with cox the originary configuration, with 
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co, the stable configuration and with coh the 6-th configuration, h - 2, 3, 
..." N - l . Then 
co ! = {N - 1, 1} 
In this way 
Í N N 
, N - N ì N - 26 
" * = l 2 + ' • 2 " ' ~ 2 
N - 4 
1 < J < -
Now using the formula to calculate the expected number of evaluations 
and denoting with nu the number of elements of the bottom (first) level of 
the 6th configuration, i = 1, 2, j and denoting with T, the total number 
of evaluations of the 6th configuration we have 
lim E [T,] = »! i 
P-* o 
lim E [T,] = 2 
and the functions are continuous. 
So we are interested in the behavior of the functions for p belonging to 
the open interval (0, 1). First of all we are going to prove that the equation 
in p: E [ T J = E [TN/2] has a unique solution in the relevant interval, 
showing that the last configuration is better for values of p inferior to this 
solution and it is worse for values superior to this solution, which will be 
denoted with p*. We have 
E [ T J = LlJÜli -f" 1 - qN~l 
En/2 
1 - qN'2 + 1 - qm 
( 1 -
1 - q 1 - q 
Equating these two expressions and simplifying we get 
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2 qN ~ 2 — 3 ?<N~2>/2 +1=0 
Setting q(N~ 2>/2 = v we reduce to 
2 v2 - 3v + 1 = 0 
which has a unique solution in the interval (0, 1), that is 




q* ~ (ij N 2 and P* ~ 1 ~ 4* 
We can see that p* decreases steadily as N increases, and 
lim p* = 0. 
Now we are going to show that V p < p* the last configuration is 
superior to the h-th configuration, h = 2, 3, . . . , - - 1. We have 
2 
N a. N , / 
2 + I I'M 
- 1 - I* . 1 - f E [Th] = — I + i
 2 
1 - q 
\ 
1 - q 1 - q 
Equating this expression to £ ^ T N / 2 j and simplifying we get 
2 # — 3 + q 2 = 0 
The unique solution to this equation in the interval (0, 1) is given by 
» = i 5 
l 
lYs 
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Given the range of values of s it follows that 
s N - 2 
which implies 
q* > q, and so p* < p 
This fact coupled with the behavior in the neighbouring of p = 0 
allows us to conclude that V p < p* 
E[Th]>E [ tw2] 
Now we are going to show that V p > p* the first configuration is 
superior to the 6-th configuration, 6 = 2, 3, ..., ^ - 1. Let us define 
A = E [Th] - E [ T J 
Then with a little algebra we get 
\ 




+ j - i 
7 
so that the sign of A depends on the sign of the last factor. Since 
> 
N - 2 N 
+ s - 1 
it follows 
I l/(N/2 + s-1) ^ 2/(N-2) 
2 > 2 
Then 
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! 2/(N-2) DAN/2 +1-1) 
p>p*=>q<q*=>q<± =>* <I 
2 2 
Consequently, V p > />*, 
A > 0 
which proves our assertion. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Two features characterize the model of decision structure proposed in 
this paper: first of all, the quasi-lexicographic ordering of the configurations 
resulting from given N (total number of members) and k (number of levels); 
secondly, the particular decision rules that govern the decision process, that 
is polyarchy within the levels, and hierarchy between the levels. Two main 
results are obtained. The first one is that the introduced ordering is con-
sistent with the ordering of the probabilities to make the right decision, 
whatever be p, the individual skills; the second one is related to the ex-
pected total time necessary to reach the decision, measured by the expected 
total number of evaluations: here for low values of p the last (stable) 
configuration is superior, while for medium and high values of p the first 
(originary) configuration is superior. The other configurations are never 
superior. To put it bluntly, looking at the appearance of the first and of the 
ast configuration, this second result means that if the members of the 
arganization are not brilliant then it is better to resort to a "democratic" 
structure, while if they are brilliant the optimal solution is an "oligarchic" 
structure. 
APPENDIX 
To prove, if «1 > n2 + 1, 
1 - Y ' 1 > 1 -
1 - <f2 1 - cf2 +1 
Proof 
Let us consider the function 
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/ < * ) = T—Çrk x>y>
 0 < <? < 1 
1 — qy +K 
The numerator of the derivative with respect to k, after dividing for qk is 
equal to 
l og r fd - qx + k)qy - (1 - <?+k)<f] 
It follows that 
dk 
and this proves our assertion. 
REFERENCES 
CATALANI M.S. and CLERICO G.F. "Pyramid Structures in the Decision Process: A Preliminary 
Note", Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, No. 6-7, 1993, 40, 
587-97. 
SAH R.K. and STIGLITZ J.E., "Human Fallibility and Economic Organization", American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings, 1985, 75, 292-97. 
and •, "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies", American 
Economic Review, 1986, 76, 716-27. 
and -, "Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies", Economic Journal, 1988, 98, 451-70. 
and , "The Quality of Managers in Centralized versus Decentralized Organizations", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 6, 1991. 
STRUTTURE DECISIONALI DI TIPO PIRAMIDALE: PROPRIETÀ UL-
TERIORI 
In questo lavoro vengono analizzate ulteriori proprietà di un modello, 
strutture decisionali a piramide, presentato in un precedente saggio. Questo 
modello si presenta come un mix di poliarchia e gerarchia. Viene provato che 
un ordinamento delle configurazioni che risultano dalle differenti disposizioni 
dei membri tra i livelli secondo una legge di evoluzione enunciata è consistente 
con quello delle probabilità di prendere la decisione corretta. Inoltre viene 
mostrato che in termini di tempo necessario per prendere una decisione la prima 
e l'ultima configurazione del precedente ordinamento sono sempre superiori. 
Vengono inoltre presentati alcuni risultati minori in analisi combinatoriale. 
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 42 (1995), N. 5, 383-390 
A N O T E O N E M P L O Y M E N T 
U N D E R W A G E D I S C R I M I N A T I O N 
by 
YEUNG-NAN SHIEH * 
1. Introduction 
In her famous book, The Economics of Imperfect Competition (1933), 
J. Robinson examined the impact of price discrimination on total output and 
observed the following important propositions. 
R.l. The slope of the marginal cost enters into the determination of the size of 
the output change but not the direction of that change by discrimination. 
R.2. A necessary condition for lower prices in two separate markets is a 
decreasing marginal cost function 
Later, E. Silberberg (1970), K.G. Lofgren (1977) confirmed Robin-
son's R. l . mathematically, and W.J. Smith and J.P. Formby (1981) demon-
strated R.l . graphically. K.G. Lofgren (1977) also obtained R.2. mathemat-
ically. 
Recently, M. Bronfenbrenner (1971), R B. Ekelund, R.S. Higgins and 
* San Jose State University, Department of Economics, San Jose, CA (U.S.A.). 
1 Robinson states that "When the output is altered by the introduction of price discrimina-
tion the marginal cost may be altered. It is true that when output would be increased by 
discrimination the increase will be carried less far if marginal costs are rising; and if output 
would be reduced by discrimination it will be reduced by less if marginal costs are falling (so 
that the cost of a smaller output is greater than of a larger output). But the alteration in 
marginal cost cannot be sufficient to prevent the change in output, for if it were so the 
alteration in marginal cost would not occur. Moreover, if marginal cost is falling, an increase 
in output due to discrimination will be enhanced; and if marginal costs are rising, a decrease 
m output will be enhanced. If the increase in output due to price discrimination is sufficiently 
great and if marginal cost is falling sufficiently rapidly, the effect of discrimination may be to 
lower the price in both markets". (1933, pp. 194-195). 
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C.W. Smithson (1981), C.C. Mai and J.J. Shih (1982), and J.P. Formby, S. 
Layson and W.J. Smith (1982) extended Robinson's neoclassical theory of 
price discrimination to the hiring of labor. M. Bronfenbrenner (1971) 
showed graphically that total employment is unchanged by wage discrimina-
tion if two supply curves in two separate markets are linear. R.B. Ekelund, 
R.S. Higgins and C.W. Smithson (1981) examined the non-linear case and 
showed that the wage discrimination will increase total employment if two 
supply curves are both concave (convex) and the relatively elastic supply 
curve has a lower adjusted concavity. C.C. Mai and J.J. Shih (1982) 
exploited a Lagrangian technique suggested by W. Leontief (1940) to show 
that R.B. Ekelund, R.S. Higgins and C.W. Smithson's results are valid only 
when the point of maximum non-discriminatory profits and maximum 
discriminatory profits are very close together. J.P. Formby, S. Layson and 
W.J. Smith (1982) used a counter-example to show the fallibility of the 
"adjusted concavity" criterion in predicting the sign of change in total 
employment by wage discrimination and offered an alternative criterion 
which they called the SMC-DMC (simple monopsonist's factor cost curve-
discriminatory monopsonist's factor cost curve) criterion2. However, these 
writers did not examine the role of marginal revenue product in wage 
discrimination and the necessary condition for higher wages in both markets 
explicitly. 
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. Following K.G. Lofgren's 
approach, we show mathematically that the slope of the marginal revenue 
product curve enters into the determination of the size of the employment 
change but not the sign of that change by wage discrimination. We also 
show that a necessary condition for higher wages in both labor markets by 
wage discrimination is an increasing marginal revenue product curve. This 
indicates that the gist of R. l . and R.2. does carry over to the employment 
effect of wage discrimination. 
2. The Model 
Suppose that a monopsonist uses a single input, labor, to produce a 
product which was sold in a monopolistic market. Assume also that workers 
2 In a passing note, FORMBY, LAYSON and SMITH (1982) mentioned that the sign of change in 
employment is independent of the slope of MRP (marginal revenue product) curve. But they did 
not show it. 
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are segregated into two markets and the monopsonist hires workers from 
both markets. The cost functions are 
where W is the wage rate and L, is employment in market i. Wt = ft (L,) 
is the supply curve, dWfdL, = f¡ > 0 and i = 1, 2. The production 
function can be specified as: 
q — G (L) = G (Li + L2), Gl—dq/dL > 0, GLL=d2q/dL2 < 0 (2) 
where L = L t + L2 is total employment. The revenue function is 
R = p (q) q = p [G (L)] G (L), pq = < 0 (3) 
where p (<y) is the demand function in the output market. 
To investigate the effect of wage discrimination on total employment 
of a monopsony, we follow K.G. Lofgren (1977), C.C. Mai and J.J. Shih 
(1982), and E. Silberberg (1970), and specify the objective function of a 
monopsony as: 
Max n = p (q) q - Q - C2, st. Wx-W2=k (4) 
where k is a parameter. In the simple monopsony case, Wx = W2 and 
k = 0. In the discriminating monopsony case, Wx - W2 = k > 0. Via 
the standard comparative statics, we can examine how total employment 
changes when k moves from zero to equilibrium value, k* = Wx - W2> 
under the maximum discriminatory profits, nd, or from k* towards zero 
under the maximum non-discriminatory profits n*. 
The Lagrangian function of this constrained profit maximization prob-
lem is: 
V = p [G (Lx + L2)] G (LJ + L2) - Wx (Lx) Lx - W2 (L2) L2 
+ A (k - Wx + W2) (5) 
where X is the Lagrange multiplier, and Lv L2 and A are choice variables. 
The first-order conditions are obtained by setting the first partial deriv-
ative of V with respect to Lv L2 and A equal to zero: 
C,(L,) = WjLi = fi (L¡) L¡ G) 
VL1 = MRP - MFCX - Af\ = 0 
VL2 = MRP - MFC2 + A/:, = 0 
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l t r - R P = ( P t P f ] G l = { M R ) G l i s t h e marginai revenue product, 
MFC i - W; + Eft is the marginal factor cost. From (6) and (7), we obtain 
(MRP - MFC J/(MRP - MFC2) = - ( f ' f f ' f ( 9 ) 
In other words, the ratio of the difference between MRP and MFC in each 
market equals the negative ratio of the slopes of labor supply curves. Equa-
tions (6) and (7) can also be written as 
X = (MFC2 - MFCx)/(f\ + f 2 ) (io) 
where X = dn/dk is the rate of change of profits when the constraint is 
relaxed or tighten, L1 and L2 adjusting to the new equilibria. 
The second-order sufficient condition requires that the following bor-
dered Hessian determinant be positive: 
D = 
MRP' - MFC\ - X f i ' MRP' - f t 
MRP' MRP' - MFC2 + Xf'f ft 
- f t ft 0 
= - MRP' ( f t + f2)2 + (f[)2MFC'2 + ( f ^ M F C \ 
+ ¿ l f " ( f 2 ) 2 - f t ' ( f t ) 2 ] > 0 (11) 
where MRP' = (2pq + p ^ ) G \ + (MR) GLL, MFC¡ = 2ft + Lft'. If 
the second-order condition is satisfied, we can solve (6)-(8) for the optimal 
values of Lh L2 and X. 
Li = M ¿ ) , L2 = L2(k), X = X(k) (12) 
It should be noted that at maximum discriminatory profits, MFCl = 
MFC2 = MRP and the optimal value of X = dn/dk = 0. To ease our analy-
sis, we assume that the local maximum solution in (12) is also a global 
maximum solution. This completes the model that constitutes our basic 
analytical framework. 
3. Effects of Wage Discrimination 
We are now in a position to examine the effects of wage discrimination 
on total employment and wage rates. Totally differentiating (6)-(8), and 
using Cramer's rule, we obtain 
dLJdk = ( - 1 /D) [(MRP' - MFC'f) ft + MRP'ft + X f t ' f t ] ( 1 3 ) 
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dLjdk = ( 1/D) [(MRP' - MFC[) f2 + MRP'fl - Xf['f2] (14) 
dh/dk = dLjdk + dLjdk 
= (1/D) [MFC'J[ - MFC'f2 - A (f[% + /2"/I)L (15) 
where D > 0. Clearly, the sign of dL/dk is ambiguous. However, from 
(15), it is easy to see that the slope of MRP does not appear in the 
numerator of dL/dk. From (15) and (11), it is also easy to see that MRP' 
and D move in the opposite direction, dL/dk is larger the larger MRP'. 
Thus, we can conclude that 
P.l. The sign of the change in total employment by wage discrimination is 
independent of the slope of the marginal revenue product, but the size of the 
change in total employment is not independent of the slope of the marginal 
revenue product. 
It is clear that P . l . is quite similar to R. l . 
Next, we examine the employment effect of wage discrimination at 
the maximum discriminatory profits, i.e., A = 0. Substituting A = 0 into 
(13) - (15), we obtain 
dLjdk = ( - 1/D) [MRP' - MFC'2)f\ + MRP'f2] (16) 
dLjdk = (1/D) [MRP' - MFC\) f2 + MRP'f\] (17) 
dL/dk = dLJdk = dLJdk 
= (1/D) (MFC'/, - MFC'JJ 
= ( l / D ) f ' f 2 ( A 2 - A l ) (18) 
D = - MRP' ( f \ + f2)2 + (f\)2 MFC'2 + (f2)2 MFC\ (19) 
where A¿ = Lf¡'/f¡ is the adjusted concavity of labor supply curve in 
market i. D > 0 if the second-order condition is met. 
Since f¡ > 0, k = Wi - W2 > 0, and D > 0, from (18), we can see 
that 
dL/dk > 0 if A2>A1 (20) 
Thus, we have 
P. 2. If the relatively more elastic supply curve has a lower adjusted concavity, 
wage discrimination will increase total employment. 
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This result is identical to Ekelund, Higgins and Smithson's (1981), Mai 
and Shih's (1982). It is of interest to note that if both supply curves are 
linear, ft' = 0 and A¡ = 0. Substituting these conditions into (18), we 
obtain the following well-known result: 
dL/dk = 0 (21) 
Thus, we have 
P. 3. If both supply curves are linear, total employment is unchanged by wage 
discrimination. 
This result is consistent with the geometrical result obtained by M. Bronfen-
brenner (1971), R.B. Ekelund, R.S. Higgins and C.W. Smithson (1981), 
and J.P. Formby, S. Layson and W.J. Smith (1982), and the mathematical 
result obtained by C.C. Mai and J.J. Shih (1982). 
Finally, we examine the effect of wage discrimination on wage rates. 
At maximum discriminatory profits, the second-order conditions require that 
MRP' - MFC\ < 0 and MRP' - MFC'2 < 0 (22) 
Substituting (22) into (16) and (17), we can show that a necessary condi-
tion for dhfdk > 0 and dL2/dk > 0 is an increasing slope of MRP3, i.e., 
MRP' > 0 (23) 
Substituting dhfdk > 0 and dhfdk > 0 into the supply curves, we obtain 
dWfdk = f \ (dhfdk) > 0, dWfdk = ft2 (dhfdk) > 0 (24) 
Thus, we can conclude that 
P. 4. A necessary condition for higher wages in both markets under discrimina-
tion is an increasing marginal revenue product curve. 
Clearly, this result is quite similar to R.2. 
4. Conclusions 
J. Robinson in her 1933 book briefly considered the effects of wage 
3 If MRP' < 0, from (16) and (17), we get dLJdk > 0 but dLJdk < 0. 
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discrimination, and noted that "The analysis is in everyway symmetrical 
with the analysis of discrimination under monopoly" (p. 225). Recent writ-
ers only examined the employment effect of wage discrimination and ig-
nored the impact of marginal revenue product function on total em-
ployment. In this note, we have shown explicitly that the slope of the 
marginal revenue product curve enters into the determination of the size of 
the employment change but not the sign of that change by wage discrimina-
tion. We have also shown that a necessary condition for higher wages in 
both labor markets by wage discrimination is that the slope of marginal 
revenue product be positive. Our results demonstrate that the gist of R. l . 
and R.2. in the output market carries over to the input market, and the 
symmetry of input and output markets holds. 
REFERENCES 
BRONFENBRENNER M., Income Distribution Theory, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971. 
EKELUND R.B., HIGGINS R.S. and SMITHSON E.W., "Can Discrimination Increase Employment? A 
Neoclassical Perspective", Southern Economic Journal, 1981, 47, 664-73. 
FORMBY J.P., LAYSON S. and SMITH W.J., "Discriminatory Changes in Employment: Comment", 
Southern Economic Journal, 1982, 49, 55-54. 
LEONTIEF W., "The Theory of Limited and Unlimited Discrimination", Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 1940, 64, 490-501. 
LOFGREN K.G., "A Note on Output under Discrimination", Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Econo-
miche e Commerciali, 1977, 24, 776-82. 
MAI C.C. and SHIH J., "Employment Effect under Monopsony Wage Discrimination", Southern 
Economic Journal, 1982, 49, 242-45. 
PIGOU A.C., The Economics of Welfare, London: MacMillan, 1920. 
ROBINSON J., The Economics of Imperfect Competition, London: MacMillan, 1933. 
SAMUELSON P.A., Foundation of Economic Analysis, enlarged edition, Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1983. 
SILBERBERG E., "Output Under Discriminating Monopoly: A Revisit", Southern Economic Jour-
nal, 1970, 37, 84-87. 
SMITH W.J. and FORMBY J.P., "Output Changes under Third Degree Price Discrimination: A 
Re-examination", Southern Economic Journal, 1981, 48, 164-71. 
3 9 0 YEUNG-NAN SHIEH 
NOTA SULL'OCCUPAZIONE CON DISCRIMINAZIONE SALARIALE 
Questo articolo esamina il ruolo del ricavo marginale sugli effetti della discri-
minazione salariale. Si mostra che la curva del ricavo marginale influisce sull'am-
montare della variazione dell'occupazione ma non sul segno della variazione do-
vuta alla discriminazione salariale. Mostra anche che una condizione necessaria 
per avere salari più elevati in entrambi i mercati del lavoro con discriminazione 
salariale è una curva crescente del ricavo marginale. Questo indica che alcune 
importanti affermazioni circa l'effetto sulla produzione della discriminazione del 
prezzo valgono anche per l'effetto sull'occupazione della discriminazione salariale. 
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by 
ÑECLA V. GEYIKDAGI * 
1. Introduction 
Tourism can make significant economic and social contributions to 
most countries in the world. However, it is of even greater importance for 
developing countries since, being a labour intensive sector, it can alleviate 
unemployment while bringing in foreign currency which is much needed in 
development efforts. It would thus be essential to know the factors influenc-
ing the demand for travel to a certain country. 
Using the case of Turkey, a rapidly developing travel market, this 
paper attempts to build an econometric tourism demand model by adding a 
new factor, the improvement of the tourism product, to previously used 
determinants such as the income of tourists, transportation costs, exchange 
rates, the own price of the product and the price of its substitutes. One can 
surmise that for a developing country with an initially insufficient tourism 
product, it is critically important to improve it in order to attract more 
foreign tourists. In other words, better and more hotels, restaurants, air-
ports, roads, means of transportation etc., which make up the tourism prod-
uct, could play a major role in increasing the number of travellers coming 
to the country. 
2. The Turkish Tourist Market 
The 1980s witnessed a remarkable development in demand for Tur-
* Eastern Mediterranean University, Faculty of Business and Economics, Gazi Magusa, N. 
Cyprus (Turkey). 
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kish tourism. With the exception of two years of decline, 1982 and 1986 
the number of foreign travellers steadily increased from 1.3 million in 1980 
to 5.4 in 1990 (Turkish Ministry of Tourism 1991, p. 81). The first decline 
coincided with the economic recession of the early 1980s. The second one 
occurred when a series of international terrorist acts resulting in the bomb-
ing of Libya by the Americans and the Chernobil nuclear accident precipi-
tated a brief reduction in international travel to several countries of Europe 
The growth of tourism receipts were even more remarkable. Earnings 
from tourism increased from $327 million in 1980 to $3,308 million in 
1990 (ibid). However, a change in the data collection methods at the end of 
1983 is believed to be responsible for at least a part of this increase (Tüsiad 
1988, p. 16). 
The Turkish public sector played a leading role in investing in the 
tourism sector. The Turizm Bankasi (Tourism Bank) was established by the 
government in 1955 with the aim of undertaking all kinds of tourism 
investments as well as offering credits to the private investors. Two other 
banks as well as the State Pension Fund were urged to invest in the 
accommodation sector (Sahin, 1990). Until the mid-1980s, the public sector 
invested more than the private sector in tourism providing both infrastruc-
ture and superstructure (Geyikdagi, 1992). When the major infrastructure 
projects were completed and the international tourism demand gained 
momentum, private investors (both domestic and foreign) have shown a 
greater interest in tourism investments, especially after 1984 Then the 
principal public investor, the Tourism Bank, was advised to leave the'field 
of direct investments, and focus on providing credits to the private sector 
(State Planning Organization, 1985, p. 134). In fact, its properties have 
been put on the market for sale as a part of the privatisation programme in 
1988. While the total fixed investments in Turkey increased slightly more 
than 4 times, fixed investments in tourism rose by 30 times in real terms 
between 1965 and 1989 (Tobb, 1990, p. 23). 
3. Demand Analysis 
Specification of the Model. - Previous studies have established that disposa-
ble income, cost of tourism in the destination, cost of substitutes, exchange 
rates and transportation costs were factors affecting tourism demand The 
econometric model in this study employs per capita tourist arrivals in 
' Iller Bankasi and Türkiye Emlak Kredi Bankasi. 
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Turkey as the dependent variable. Since the demand for foreign tourism 
from a given country is expected to depend on the population of that 
country, ceteris paribus, population is sometimes included as an explanatory 
variable. However, this study adopts the practice of modifying the de-
pendent variable, like some other authors (Bechdolt, 1973 and Witt, 1980) 
did before, by dividing the number of arrivals from the origin into its 
population. . - i 
Explanatory variables are the real disposable per capita income in the 
origin country, the price of tourism in Turkey (the cost of living for tourists 
in Turkey and the cost of travel to Turkey), a substitute price (as a weighted 
composite of the cost of living in two substitute destinations, Italy and 
Greece, and the transport costs to them as well as the origin country cost of 
living for tourists) and the exchange rate of the Turkish Lira against the 
origin country currencies. In addition to these usual variables, a two-year 
lagged real gross fixed investment in the Turkish tourism sector was in-
cluded as a proxy to the progress and the improvement of the tourist 
product. The duration of the lag was based on the consideration that tour-
ism projects took an average of two years for completion. Two dummy 
variables were also incorporated into the model to take into account the 
effects of the political turmoil of 1980 in Turkey and the bombing of Libya 
in 1986 by the Americans. In order to see changing tastes for Turkish 
tourism, a trend term was also included in the model. 
While the inclusion of promotional expenditures was considered, it 
was not possible to construct an appropriate form of variable. First, the 
marketing activities, which were supported by the Turkish Ministry of 
Tourism, constitute only a part of the overall promotional efforts. When the 
support of the foreign tourist operators was combined with the well organ-
ised travel trade in Turkey, the tourism marketing done by the private sector 
proved to be quite successful. However, it was not possible to provide data 
on the promotional expenditures of the private sector. Secondly, the Turkish 
government recognised that demand was generally running ahead of supply, 
especially in the mid-1980s, and the Ministry of Tourism maintained a 
low profile in marketing (Turkish Ministry of Tourism, 1990). Despite 
significant decreases in the promotional expenditures, the volume of tourism 
to Turkey continued to grow steadily. 
The relationship among the relevant variables are expressed in the 
double logarithmic form. The double logarithmic demand functions have 
been the most frequently employed econometric form in such analyses for 
two main reasons. First, it is practical to employ logarithmic transformations 
to fit nonlinear functions into linear ones so that the ordinary least square 
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(OLS) method can still be used. Secondly, the parameters of the double 
logarithmic equation are the elasticities of the respective variables and the 
equation corresponds to a preference ordering of behavioural demand 
functions. 
The specification of the model is 
In = ay + a2j In + afnCJt + a f n L j t + a f n E j t + a f n S t _ 2  
1F rjt 
+ a1]DVll + agjDV2t + a9T + ujt 
j = 1, ... 12 (origin countries) 
t = 1, ... 14 (1 = 1976, ... 14 = 1989) 
where, 
Aj, is the number of tourist arrivals in Turkey from country j in 
year t 
Pjt is country ƒ s population in year t 
Yjt is the real national disposable income (in 1975 prices) of 
country j in year t 
Cjt is the total of a ten-day period cost of living for tourists in 
Turkey and the cost of travel from origin j in year t (in 1975 
prices) 
Ljt is a weighted average of the cost of tourism in substitute destina-
tions for residents of origin j in year t including the travel costs 
from origin; to substitute destinations (in 1975 prices) 
Ljt is the value of country ƒ s currency in terms of Turkish Lira in 
year t 
St_2 is the gross fixed investment (in 1975 prices) in the Turkish 
tourism sector lagged two years 
DV1, is a dummy variable to measure the impact of the political 
turmoil in 1980 and 1981 (DVlt = 1 if / = 5 and t = 6, 0 
otherwise) 
DV2t is a dummy variable to capture the effects of the 1986 bombing 
of Libya (DV2t = 1 if t = 11) 
T is the trend term 
Ujt is a random disturbance term 
ay, ... a 9 j are parameters to be estimated. 
Data and Estimation Procedure. - The dependent variable, the quantity of 
tourism or the number of arrivals at the frontiers, were extracted from 
OECD's Tourism Policy and International Tourism in OECD Member Coun-
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tries. The population figures are from the various issues of Euromonitor's 
European Marketing Data and Statistics. 
Since the disposable income takes into account the transfers from 
abroad, it was preferred to national income. J.R. Artus (1972) and S.Y. 
Kwack (1972) also used disposable income in their analyses. OECD's Na-
tional Accounts (1989 and 1990) were the data sources for the income var-
iable. . . . j 
As the tourism product is made up from various commodities, and 
each tourist has a different spending pattern, there is no single tourism 
price In this analysis, daily tourist prices, consisting of the cost of lodging, 
two meals and a breakfast were calculated for each country. Fodor's Europe 
1990 gives average tourist costs in 1990. These prices were deflated by the 
hotel and restaurant price indices based on the average changes extracted 
from OECD's Tourism Policy and International Tourism in OECD Member 
Countries to provide series covering the whole 1976 to 1989 period. Since 
about 80 per cent of the tourists from Western Europe to Turkey travel by 
air air fares are assumed to represent travel costs. However, the model of 
Greece does not include air fares as the majority of Greek tourists travel to 
Turkey by land and sea. Air fares were extracted from the ABC World 
Airways Guide (Reed Travel Group) and exchange rates were taken from 
the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics Year-
book (1990). The tourists' cost of living for ten days in Turkey and the cost 
of travel from origin to Turkey were combined to reach a single own price 
for each country. 
Another price variable used by researchers is the tourist prices in 
competing destinations including the own country of the tourists them-
selves. While some authors (Jud and Joseph, 1974; Uysal and Crompton, 
1985) included only tourists' cost of living in substitute destinations, others 
(Witt and Witt, 1990) employed both tourists' cost of living and travel costs 
to the alternative destinations as separate variables. This study, however, 
like the work of Little (1980), employs a weighted average cost of substi-
tute destinations, combining both tourists' living costs and transport 
expenses in a single variable. The weights which were based on the relative 
market shares of the competing destinations were used by some researchers 
(Jud and Joseph, 1974 and Little, 1980). 
Two Mediterranean destinations, Greece and Italy, were selected in 
addition to each origin country, as possible substitute destinations. Like 
Greece and Italy, Turkey is endowed with a comparable historical heritage 
as well as a mild Mediterranean climate. Hence, the substitute price, faced 
by the tourists of each origin country, was calculated as the composite of the 
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tourist prices in the three countries. Since air travel is not the most popular 
form of transport from Greece to Italy and Turkey, air transport costs were 
not included in the model of Greece. Obviously, the tourists from Italy and 
Greece would have two substitute destinations, not three as in other origin 
countries. The composite substitute prices were calculated for each origin 
country by applying weights based on their market shares of Italy and 
Greece and an arbitrary weight of 0.5 for the own country of tourists. The 
origin country has been given this constant weight of 0.5, assuming that 
domestic tourism was the major competitor for any foreign holiday (Loeb, 
1982; Uysal and Crompton, 1985; Witt and Witt, 1990). However, the 
weights for the two substitute Mediterranean destinations change over time 
as a moving average of the previous three years' demand for these desti-
nations. 
The supply (product improvement) variable is the real fixed capital 
investment (in 1975 prices) in the tourism sector of Turkey realised two 
years earlier. The data have been obtained from OECD Economic Surveys: 
Turkey for various years. 
A separate demand equation for each origin country, Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom and the Unites States, was estimated by using the 
OLS procedure. The Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistic was calculated to check 
the presence of autocorrelation. Whenever autocorrelation appeared, the 
equation was reestimated by using the Cochrane-Orcutt (CO) procedure. 
Results. - Each model has been estimated for all possible subsets of explana-
tory variables. The most satisfactory models have been chosen and pre-
sented in Table 1. The criteria for the satisfactoriness are (i) an F statistic 
indicating that the equation is significantly different from zero at the 5 per 
cent level, (ii) "correct" signs for the coefficients, and (iii) a D-W statistic 
lying between 1.6 and 2.4. 
A positive sign for the income, exchange rate, substitute prices and 
supply coefficients and a negative sign for the coefficients of own price and 
the dummy variables are theoretically expected. Whenever its coefficient 
had a wrong sign, that variable was deleted from the equation or tried in 
another set of variables. Since there are no clear cut rules for choosing the 
best estimated models, the process contains a certain extent of subjectivity. 
The _most satisfactory results were selected by comparing R2 (or corrected 
R2, R2) values and t statistics. Where the coefficients are not statistically 
significant but have correct signs, weak support is exhibited for their inclu-
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Sion in the model. In this study, variables with coefficients which were not 
significant but had the correct sign were therefore still retained. 
Contrary to all expectations, the income coefficients had either wrong 
signs or were statistically insignificant even when one-year lagged variables 
were used. The income variable appeared in three of the models, having 
coefficients which range from 0.713 for Sweden to 6.358 for Holland. 
Thus, a real disposable income rise of 1 per cent in the Netherlands is 
estimated to result in a 6.358 per cent increase in tourist arrivals to Turkey 
from this country, ceteris paribus. 
The own price variable appeared in five of the twelve models although 
the coefficient was not significant in any case. The model of Greece had the 
highest coefficient for the own price, followed by Germany. For example, a 
1 per cent decrease in the own price of Turkish tourism (the composite of 
the real cost of living and the transport cost to Turkey) would result in a 
0.622 per cent increase in tourist arrivals from Germany to Turkey, other 
things remaining constant. 
In Table 1, eight models contained substitute price variables with 
coefficients ranging from 0.256 for Sweden to 3.048 for Austria. However, 
the interpretation of the substitute variable is not so simple since it is à 
composite of different costs the effects of which cannot be separated easily. 
When explaining the meaning of the estimated coefficient of a variable, 
others are assumed to remain unchanged. Price variables are influenced not 
only by the cost of living and travel expenses but also by the exchange rates. 
Since the exchange rate affects the demand through its influence on 
tourists' costs of living, an allowance for this must be made when interpret-
ing the coefficient of the exchange rate variable. This allowance may be as 
much as the ratio of the tourists' cost of living in the total composite price. 
For instance, a 1 per cent increase in the value of the Greek drachma results 
in an increase in tourism demand of not only 0.78 per cent as the exchange 
rate coefficient of Greece would indicate, but more than that, perhaps up to 
1.5 per cent, after including the own price coefficient into the calculation. 
The dummy variable for the political instability in Turkey in 1980 and 
1981, DV1, has a negative coefficient for all of the countries. Tourism was 
negatively influenced when political violence started to climb at the end of 
the 1970s. In 1980, when the turmoil reached its peak, tourists avoided 
Turkey in large numbers. Although the military intervention, in September 
of that year, brought calm to the country, the demand was not expected to 
return soon to the normal levels of the politically stable years. Those people 
who were averse to military regimes stayed away for a while until the 
civilians came back to power. In fact, the models for Italy and the United 
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Kingdom gave better results with a three-year period (1980-81-82) of dum-
my inclusion and Greece was better with only one year (1980). However, 
the 1986 bombing of Libya had affected the demand for Turkish tourism 
only from three countries. This was the only variable with a significant 
coefficient in the equation of the United States. 
The magnitude of the impact may be seen by focusing solely on the 
relevant dummy variables and comparing them with a normal year 2. The 
percentage fall in demand in 1980 compared to 1979 was 64 for Greece, 46 
for Switzerland, 44 for Finland, 39 for Germany, 37 for the Netherlands, 
28 for Belgium and the United States, 24 for France and Italy, 18 for 
Austria, 15 for the United Kingdom and 13 for Sweden. Similarly, the 
impact of the 1986 American bombing of Libya led to a 53 per cent 
reduction in demand from the United States. 
The supply variable shows the greatest impact on the demand. When 
the accommodation and transportation facilities gradually improved in the 
1980s as a result of high public and private investments which started 
earlier, Turkey attracted steadily an increasing number of tourists from Eur-
ope. These investments not only upgraded the quality and quantity of accom-
modation establishments but also added new airports and motorways or im-
proved existing ones, and this greatly facilitated access to touristic sites. It is 
quite obvious that more tourists would be attracted by the markedly better 
and faster means of transportation as well as by high quality accommoda-
tion. Eight of the eleven supply coefficients (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Holland, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom) are statistically 
significant at a 5 per cent level. While a 1 per cent rise in tourism invest-
ments in Turkey resulted in a 0.642 per cent increase in tourist arrivals 
from the United Kingdom with a two-year lag, the Greek tourists were 
found to be totally indifferent to the supply conditions. 
The coefficients of the supply variable have to be interpreted with 
some caution. From the time lags between the investment on the supply 
facilities and the subsequent increase in tourist flows, it can be inferred that 
the changes in the investment level led to changes in tourist arrivals. 
However, at the end of the 1980s, the direction of causation was probably 
reversed. A questionnaire survey (Geyikdagi, 1992), which was carried out 
in early 1992, showed that the major motivation for investing in the Tur-
kish tourism sector by several foreign investors was the growing number of 
tourist arrivals to Turkey. The direction of causation was probably running 
2 The equation of a country for 1980 is subtracted from the equation of 1979 and its antilog 
is taken in order to get the level of demand in 1979. 
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both ways and creating a causal chain at the end of the 1980s and the early 
years of the 1990s. Since this study does not include years beyond 1989, it 
should not have conceivably suffered much from the changing direction'of 
this causal relationship. In any case, the maintenance of high standards is 
expected to be one of the main preoccupations of the tourism sector to 
sustain the demand. 
In the majority of the models, the trend term was the cause of multicol-
linearity, having high correlation with the price variables. It was statistically 
significant only in the model of Finland. The coefficient of trend shows the 
increasing popularity of Turkish tourism in Finland, with a 21 per cent 
growth per year 3. 
While most of the origin countries have meaningful results, with 
high R2 values, the outcome of the United States shows the poorest fit. The 
model explains only 58 per cent of the variation in the dependent variable 
and has no meaningful economic coefficient at all. One of the reasons for 
this exceptionally poor result may be the travel warnings or advisories 
issued by the State Department of the United States that usually show 
Turkey, partly or as a whole, as a place to be avoided (for example Stroller, 
1991, p. 32). Another reason may be the difficulty in modelling countries 
with very low per capita travel to Turkey, such as the United States. 
4. Conclusions 
The aim |of this study has been to further the understanding of the 
behavioural aspects of tourism. Some of the demand variables affecting 
tourist arrivals in Turkey have been examined by using an econometric 
model. The supply variable (a two-year lagged fixed capital investment in 
tourism) which was chosen as a proxy to the progress and upgrading of the 
tourism product in Turkey has shown the greatest impact on the demand. 
The improvement of the accommodation and transportation facilities seems 
to have caused increases in the number of tourist arrivals. One of the lead-
ing tourist operators of the world, Touristic Union International (TUI), 
recently carried out a study covering 25,000 tourists who vacationed in 100 
of its establishments in five countries (Spain with the Canary Islands, Italy, 
Greece, Tunisia and Turkey). Accordingly, its establishments in Turkey 
J Similar to the treatment of the dummy variables, each equation was compared to that of the 
previous year's focusing solely on the trend term. The antilog of the difference with the previous 
year gives the level of demand in that year. 
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have received the most favourable evaluation (Turkeri, 1992, pp. 5-6). The 
survey, thus, establishes not only the general importance of the accommoda-
tion quality for tourists in their decision about selecting a holiday destina-
tion but also shows Turkey's excellence in this respect. While the establish-
ments of TUI make up only a fraction of the accommodation capacity of 
Turkey (about 3 per cent), they are still representative of the burgeoning 
industry. 
The income variable was found insignificant for the majority of the 
countries studied. Since Turkey has remained one of the least expensive 
destinations in the region, it continued to attract more tourists even when 
their incomes decreased in recessionary years and when tourist prices in-
creased in Turkey in recent years. The relative cost of tourism vis-à-vis 
substitute destinations seems to be more important for tourists as the substi-
tute price variable appears in eight of the twelve models. The dummy varia-
ble, which was to measure the effects of the political instability leading to 
the 1980 military intervention, was also found to be important for all of the 
origin countries, though at varying degrees. As the results indicate, the 1986 
bombing of Libya significantly dissuaded American tourists from travelling 
to Turkey. The trend term appeared only in the model of Finland, showing 
an increasing popularity of Turkey at a rate of 21 per cent per year. Still, 
the demand for Turkish tourism is expected to grow as long as the high 
quality of the tourism product with a competitive price is maintained in a 
reassuringly safe political environment. 
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INVESTIMENTI NELLO SVILUPPO DEL TURISMO E DOMANDA DI 
VIAGGI 
Questo articolo esamina le determinanti della domanda di turismo in un 
mercato in rapido sviluppo. Nel modello econometrico qui sviluppato come varia-
bile esplicativa è stato preso il miglioramento dello stesso prodotto turismo, 
oltre al reddito, al prezzo del prodotto e dei suoi sostituti, al tasso di cambio 
e a una coppia di variabili strumentali. Si è trovato che l'investimento di capita-
le fisso con lag di due anni scelto come proxy del miglioramento del prodotto 
turismo nel paese in esame, la Turchia, è la variabile più importante nella doman-
da di turismo da parte dei dodici paesi di origine. Questa variabile trascurata 
e tuttavia importante potrebbe d'ora innanzi essere considerata nelle analisi della 
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1. Introduction 
Commodity prices and income are the main contributors of consumers' 
demand changes. As commodity prices and/or income change, consumers 
adjust their consumption patterns accordingly in order to keep maximizing 
their utility without violating the new budget constraint. After a change in 
prices, consumers reduce the quantity demanded of some goods and increase 
or leave unchanged that of others according to price signals. The direction 
of these changes is determined by the law of demand, and their magnitudes 
depend primarily on the characteristics of commodity demand functions, 
which specify consumers sensitivity to marginal changes in prices and/or 
income. Overall, a redistribution of consumers expenditures among commod-
ities is achieved through these changes (see for example Silberberg, 1990). 
The most interesting feature though is to separate the portion of the change 
in quantity demanded due to changes in commodity prices from the changes 
in total expenditure. In theoretical grounds, the former is usually called 
"substitution effect" and the latter "income effect". 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze changes in commodity 
expenditure shares in Greece from 1960 to 1991. Our emphasis is focused 
on the relàtive contribution of prices and total expenditures. Both the abso-
lute and the relative magnitude of the total substitution and the budget 
(income) effect are measured through a decomposition analysis based on a 
* Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Sask. 
(Canada). 
** Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki (Greece). 
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duality approach. Quantitative measures of these effects are derived through 
the econometric estimates of an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a) for eight groups of commodities. 
The decomposition analysis in consumer economics tries to explain the 
changes in commodity demand over a period of time \ More precisely, the 
over time change in the quantity for a particular good is divided into two 
effects: the total substitution (price) effect and the income (budget) effect. 
The total substitution (price) effect represents the change in the quantity 
demanded of a particular good due to changes in commodity prices. This 
part consists of changes due to own-price effect as well as to the prices of 
the other goods included in consumers' optimal bundle. On the other hand, 
the income (budget) effect corresponds to the portion of the change in the 
quantity demanded arising from autonomous changes in consumers' total 
expenditure. It should be noted that the budget effect does not include any 
income changes resulted from price changes, i.e. money illusion phenome-
non is excluded. Decomposition analysis provides quantitative measures of 
the above mentioned effects and thus, it instigates new insights into explain-
ing changes in consumption patterns. 
The proposed decomposition analysis has been developed within a 
duality approach 2. It is, therefore, as flexible as duality per se with respect 
to the specification of consumers' preference. That means that duality per-
mits an econometric estimation of consumers demand functions without a 
priori knowledge of the true preference structure (Deaton and Muellbauer, 
1980b; Silberberg, 1990; Varian, 1992). All available information about 
various elasticity estimates obtained through duality is used in decomposi-
tion analysis. In this sense, decomposition analysis can be viewed as a step 
further for using duality in applied microeconomics. Futhermore, decomposi-
tion analysis provides additional information about the over time change of 
endogenous variables, i.e. quantities demanded or consumer expenditure 
shares, when all exogenous variables change simultaneously. In consumer 
economics, decomposition analysis can be developed through either equilib-
rium Marshallian demand or equilibrium expenditure share functions 3. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, the 
1 For a treatment of decomposition analysis in applied production economics see KAKO 
(1978, 1980) and KURODA (1987). 
2 Duality has also been the framework for developing decomposition analysis in applied 
production economics. 
' Emphasis should be put on the word "equilibrium" since Marshallian demand and 
expenditure shares functions, which are obtained through duality, are valid for a particular set of 
commodity prices and total expenditure (VARÍAN, 1992; CORNES, 1992). See also Section 2. 
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theoretical framework for decomposing commodity expenditure shares is 
developed. In the third section, the empirical model, the econometric proce-
dure and the data set are presented. Empirical findings, including decomposi-
tion analysis results, are analyzed in the fourth section followed by conclud-
ing remarks. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
In an aggregate level, consider that a representative consumer exists 
and maximizes a well-defined utility function, subject to a feasible budget 
constraint. The existence of a representative consumer implicitly assumes 
that a consistent aggregation across individuals with different preferences 
and income levels is possible. This means that either almost all consumers 
have precisely identical preferences or income differences are negligible 
(Muellbauer, 1976). Even though these are quite unrealistic assumptions, 
they are necessary for an analysis at national level. In the remaining part of 
the paper, it is assumed that the behaviour of the representative consumer 
approaches that of an "average" Greek consumer and leaves outside extreme 
cases. 
Assume that the behaviour of the representive Greek consumer is 
described by a well-defined expenditure function e (p, u), where p and u 
refer to commodity prices and utility, respectively. The equilibrium expendi-
ture shares are derived from e (p, u) via Shephard's lemma, and they are a 
function of p and total expenditures, m (Varian, 1992; Cornes, 1992). By 
totally differentiating the equilibrium expenditure share of the ith commodi-
ty, s¿ (p, m), with respect to time, it results in : 
dsj __ j , dij dpj dsj drrj ^ ^ ^ 
dt l = i dpj dt dm dt 
Then, by dividing through by st and rearranging terms, it yields: 
G ( , , ) = Z ^ G ( P j ) + ^ G ( m ) (2) 
i =1 alogpy oiogm 
where G ( • ) is the growth rate of the corresponding variable. 
By using the definition of expenditure share and by differentiating it 
once with respect to the logarithm of jth commodity price and then with 
respect to the logarithm of total expenditure as well as by converting the 
derived expressions into elasticity forms, it results in: 
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1 5 = + * 
and 
dlogr. 
-j! - 1 (3b) 
where 8tJ is the Kronecker delta {8- = 1 for i = j and 8¡; = 0 for z + j) \ 
By substituting (3a) and (3b) into (2), it yields: 
G (r,) = (eff + 8J G (Pj) + (« , . - 1 ) G (m) (4) 
where ejf are the Marshallian price elasticities, and «,• is the expenditure 
elasticity of the ith commodity. Combining (4) and Slutsky equation in 
elasticity form, the following relationship can be obtained: 
G ( J , ) = ¿ (e¡¡ - sj + 8tj) G (pj + (n, - 1) (g (m) - ¿ Sj G (py)j (5) 
or 
G (r,) = (sj (aij - 1) + 8tj) G (Pj) + (n, - 1) (G (m) -Zs¿G (pj) (6) 
where Y are the Hicksian price elasticities, and otJ are the Hicks-Allen 
partial elasticities of substitution. 
The left-hand side of (5) or (6) represents the percentage change in the 
expenditure share of the ith commodity. Actually, it gives the observed 
percentage change of the expenditure share of the ith commodity during a 
particular period of time. Our main task is to decompose the magnitude of 
this change into the price and the budget effect. 
The first term, on the right-hand side of (5) or (6), refers to the total 
substitution (price) effect along a given indifference curve. This effect corres-
ponds to that part of the change in the expenditure share due to price 
changes, and it is a weighted average of the percentage change in commodi-
ty prices with Hicksian elasticities and commodity shares as weights. The 
use of Hicksian elasticities ensures that this counterpart contains changes 
due to prices alone. The price effect is zero whether there are no substitu-
tion possibilities or, in the presence of substitutability, the share of the 
4 F o r a p r o o f of (3a) see GREEN a n d ALSTON (1990 ) a n d f o r (3b) s ee SILBERBERG ( 1 9 9 0 
p. 340). 
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commodity under consideration is equal to the inverse of its own Hicks-
Allen elasticity of substitution. 
The second term, on the right-hand side of (5) or (6), refers to the 
income (budget) effect. It is a weighted proportional change in total expendi-
tures after adjusting it for price changes with income elasticities used as 
weights. That is, the part that is due to price changes is subtracted from the 
observed proportional change in total expenses. Each price change is 
weighted with the expenditure share of the corresponding commodity. 
Namely, the term in parenthesis is a pure income change, i.e. money illusion 
phenomena are excluded. The second term, in (5) or (6), is zero if income 
elasticity of the ith commodity is equal to one. This means that the income-
consumption path is linear implying that consumer preferences have a homo-
thetic structure. 
In order to obtain quantitative measures of the price and the budget 
effects, empirical estimates of the Marshallian demand and expenditure 
elasticities are required. These numbers can be obtained through an econo-
metric estimation of a complete demand system which is consistent with 
economic theory. In addition, the use of a flexible demand system allows 
for no a priori restrictions on the magnitude of the estimated elasticities. 
3. Empirical Model, Statistical Data and Estimation Procedure 
The empirical model used in this paper is the AIDS developed by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a). The AIDS is a special case of PIGLOG, a 
more general function form fon demand functions (Muellbauer, 1975). Nev-
ertheless, the AIDS is still enough flexible to provide an arbitrary first-order 
approximation of any demand system, and it does not impose any a priori 
restrictions on the value of estimated parameters. Moreover, it is consistent 
with economic theory since it satisfies all properties of consumer prefer-
ences. It also provides consistent aggregates across both consumers and 
commodities and thus, it is suitable for studies like ours. 
The AIDS was built up on duality. It assumes the following expendi-
ture function: 
log e(p, «) = a 0 + Z a > g p , + i Z Z Yq log p¡ log p:+uß0 h p?' (7) 1=1 2 1 = 1 / = 1 1 ¡ =i 
where a, ß and y" are parameters to be estimated, and u refers to utility. By 
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applying Shephard's lemma in logarithmic form, the following relationship 
can be obtained: 
d l o i e ( p ' u ) = h = «, + i y ; log a + ßt«ß0hpf. (8) 
ölog Pi J = 1 ' = 1 
At any equilibrium point, total expenditure, m, is equal to the minimum 
cost of buying the optimal commodity bundle, e (p, u). Using this, solving 
(7) for u and substituting it into (8), it yields: 
s i = a¡ + Z Yij log p; + ßj log (m/P) (9) 
j = 1 
n 
where yy = V2 (YP + YP) and log (?) = A0 + Z^ a y logp ; + 
J « n 
- Z Z Ya log Pi log pj. It is, however, common to approximate log (?) by 
2 - = U = i t 
Stone's price index, j namely log ? = log P* = Z s¿ log p¡. 
1 i — i 
For (7) to be a consistent expenditure function, or equivalently, for (9) 
to be a consistent expenditure share function, the following properties must 
be satisfied: 
(i) log e (p, u) should be homogeneous of degree one in p and thus, s¡ is 
n 
homogeneous of degree zero in p. This requires that Z Y a — 0; 
7 = 1 
(ii) both log e (p, u) and s¿ are symmetric with respect to p. That is, 
(iii) no violation of the budget constraint requires that expenditure shares 
should add up to one. This implies the following set of restrictions: 
Z ai = 1 , Z ß i = 0 and Z y,v = 0. 
1 = 1 1 = 1 i = 1 
The estimated parameters of (9) can be used to calculate price and 
expenditure elasticities. A variety of approaches have been developed to 
calculate demand elasticities for the AIDS. Green and Alston (1990) have 
shown that the correct formulas for elasticity measures in AIDS are closely 
related to the estimated form of the AIDS. Whenever log (?) is approximat-
ed by Stone's index, the linear AIDS is estimated, instead of the true AIDS. 
In this case, the correct elasticity formulas in matrix form are (Green and 
Alston, 1990, 1991): 
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N + BQ-'B + i (10a) 
and 
E — [I + BQ"1 [A + I] - I (10b) 
where N is a («X 1) vector of expenditure elasticities; B is a («X 1) vector 
within typical elements bt = ß/sy, C is a ( I X « ) vector with typical 
elements C = Sj log pp t is a unit vector of length «; E is a («X«) matrix 
of Marshallian price elasticities, A is a («X«) matrix with typical elements 
aij — + yijfti - ß,sj/s,\ and I is an identity matrix. Using Slutsky equa-
tion in elasticity form, Hicks' compensated demand elasticities are given as: 
H = E + NW' (10c) 
where H is («X«) matrix of Hicksian elasticities, and W is a («X 1) vector 
of expenditure shares. 
Econometric estimation of equations (9) requires data on commodity 
prices and expenditures. For the purposes of this study, eight aggregate 
commodity groups are considered. These groups are food, beverages and 
tobacco, clothing and footwear, housing, house durables, medical care, trans-
portation and communication and other commodities such as recreation, 
entertainment, education, and other services. Even though this aggregation 
scheme is somehow arbitrary, it has been adopted for analytical purposes. 
These commodity categories are considered to be the more interesting from 
both consumer and policy-makers viewpoints. All data are taken from the 
National Accounts published by NSSG (National Statistical Services of 
Greece). Commodity expenditures are at current prices, and prices are indices 
constructed by NSSG with 1980 as a base year. Total expenditure, m, 
consists of all commodity expenditures, and it is not equal to consumer 
income since savings are not taken into account. 
The system of equations (9) has been estimated by using an Iterative 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (ISUR) method (Zellner, 1962; Oberhofer 
and Kmenta, 1974; Judge et ah, 1980). SUR is the most appropriate meth-
od of estimation since the system of equations (9) has been derived 
through an optimization problem which implies that the error terms across 
equations are contemporaneously correlated. This means that any decision 
errors associated with the ith commodity affect the optimal level of all other 
commodities through substitutional (complementary) relationships. These 
interrelationships cannot be taken into account by estimating the system 
with OLS. Moreover, appropriate imposition of the restrictions suggested 
by economic theory (homogeneity, symmetry and adding-up) requires the 
use of SUR. Notice that symmetry cannot be imposed by using OLS. Final-
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ly, it should be mentioned that I SUR estimates are equivalent to maximum 
likelihood regardless of the equation dropped. In our case, the equation of 
other commodities has been dropped. 
4. Empirical Findings 
The estimated parameters of the AIDS applied to Greek consumption 
data are reported in Table 1. These estimates have been obtained by impos-
TABLE 1 
A I D E M A N D S Y S T E M W I T H S Y M M E T R Y A N D H O M O G E N E I T Y I M P O S E D , 
G R E E C E , 1960-1991 
Commodity 0| Vil ra 
P a r 
YI3 
m e t e r s 
Yi4 
e s t i m a t e d 
Yi5 Yi6 YI7 Yi? Pi 
1. Food 0.350 0.225 -0.004 -0.108 -0.053 -0.013 -0.025 -0.010 -0.012 -0.132 
(88.44) (4.42) (-0.26) (-5.13) (-2.47) (-0.68) (-1.90) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-8.91) 
2. Beverages and 0.060 0.036 0.000 -0.011 -0.025 -0.002 -0.029 0.035 0.002 
Tobacco (45.28) (4.38) (0.003) (-1.20) (-2.96) (-0.35) (-3.45) (2.76) (0.42) 
3. Clothing and 0.086 0.065 0.031 0.016 0.018 0.039 -0.061 0.020 
Footwear (50.50) (2.79) (2.07) (1.17) (1.69) (3.16) (-3.07) (2.63) 
4. Housing 0.119 0.085 -0.005 -0.002 -0.019 -0.026 -0.009 
(73.40) (4.82) (-0.42) (0.20) (-1.69) (-1.72) (-1.19) 
5. Durables 0.081 0.043 0.018 -0.009 -0.026 0.000 
(54.51) (2.84) (2.11) (-0.75) (-1.81) (0.057) 
6. Medical care 0.032 -0.023 0.021 -0.004 0.013 
(29.71) (-2.43) (2.39) (-0.43) (2.74) 
7. Transportation 0.127 0.003 0.004 0.044 
& Communication (51.52) (0.14) (0.23) (5.80) 
8. Others 1 0.145 0.09 0.062 
- Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
- The estimates of the parameters without t-ratio are calculated through the imposed restrictions. 
ing the properties of symmetry and homogeneity into expenditure share 
equations. Moreover, the adding-up restriction is a fortiori imposed since 
the expenditure share equation corresponding to all other goods has been 
dropped in the estimation procedure. Monotonicity and concavity of the 
expenditure function with respect to commodity prices hold at any sample 
point. Monotonicity can be checked by computing the predicted expenditure 
shares, which should all be positive. Given the estimated parameters, it can 
be shown that this holds at any sample point. On the other hand, concavity 
of the expenditure function requires Slutsky matrix to be negatively semi-def-
inite. This holds as long as the own-price Hicksian elasticities are negative. 
The latter is assured through Slutsky's equation since all own-price Marshal-
CHANGES IN GREEK CONSUMPTION PATTERNS 4 1 3 
lian elasticities are negative, and expenditure elasticities are positive (see 
Table 2 and 3). 
The estimated coefficients a¡ show how the Greek consumer allocates 
his expenditure among alternative commodities used at the base year. Accord-
ing to our results, in 1980, Greek consumers allocated their total expendi-
ture as follows: 35% to food, 6% to beverages and tobacco, 8.6% to 
clothing and footwear, almost 12% to housing, 8 % to housing durables, 
3.2% to medical care and 12.7% to transportation and communication 
services. In 1975, the corresponding figures for U.K. were 31.5%, 16.4%, 
6%, 10%, 2 % and 10%, respectively (Muellbauer and Pashardes, 1992). 
According to Anderson and Blundell's (1983) result, Canadian consumers 
spent 34% of their total expenditure in food, beverages and tobacco, 13% 
in clothing and footwear and almost 15% in transportation and communica-
tion services. Definitely, these figures are not directly comparable since they 
refer to different years, but they provide some indications about consumers' 
preferences in each country. 
All commodities, except food and housing (accommodation), are found 
to be luxuries. In the AIDS, negative b¡ implies necessities while positive b¡ 
indicates luxuries (Blanciforti and Green, 1983). Note, however, that the 
estimated b¡ parameter for housing equation is statistically insignificant at 
10% significant level. A similar reasoning holds for beverages and tobacco 
and house durables. Muellbauer and Pashardes (1992) found that all com-
modities in the U.K., except food and tobacco and beverages, are classified 
as luxuries during the period 1954 to 1980. On the other hand, Blanciforti 
and Green (1983) found that U.S. consumers faced only house durables as 
TABLE 2 
C O M P E N S A T E D P R I C E E L A S T I C I T I E S , G R E E C E , 1960-1991 
P r i c e 0 f C o m m o d i t y 
Commodi ty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Food -0.014 0.054 -0.201 -0.024 0.044 -0.031 0.076 0.096 
2. Beverages and 
Tobacco 
0.293 -0.368 0.103 -0.046 -0.313 0.006 -0.353 0.677 
3. Clothing and 
Footwear 
-0.706 0.064 -0.257 0.435 0.240 0.214 0.490 -0.480 
4. Housing -0.065 -0.023 0.349 -0.201 0.042 0.022 -0.045 -0.080 
5. Durables 0.200 -0.241 0.300 0.068 -0.392 0.258 -0.004 -0.192 
6. Medical care -0.306 0.009 0.581 0.076 0.564 -1.579 0.668 0.013 
7. Transportat ion 
& Gtmmunfcation 
0.256 -0.237 0.501 -0.068 -0.010 0.252 -0.858 0.164 
8. Others 0.260 0.357 -0.415 -0.090 -0.135 0.001 0.145 -0.122 
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luxuries. In contrast, Canadian consumers classified transportation, commu-
nication and recreation services as luxuries (Anderson and Blundell, 1983). 
The compensated (Hicksian) demand elasticities are reported in Table 
2. All own-price Hicksian elasticities are, as it was expected, negative indicat-
ing a downward sloping utility-constant demand function for all commodity 
categories. This, furthermore, implies a negative own-price substitution 
effect. In addition, by using the signs of the cross-price elasticities, indica-
tions about the substitutability (complementarity) between commodities in 
the Hicksian sense can be obtained. As net substitutes are considered to be 
the following pairs of commodities: food-beverages and tobacco; food-hous-
ing durables; food-transportation and communication services; beverages and 
tobacco-clothing and footwear; beverages and tobacco-medical care; clothing 
and footwear-housing; clothing and footwear-housing durables; clothing and 
footwear-medical care; housing-housing durables; housing-medical care; 
housing durables-medical care; and medical care-transportation and commu-
nication services. All other commodity pairs exhibit a complementarity rela-
tionship. Similar substitutability relationships have been found by Muell-
bauer and Pashardes (1992) for the U.K. except for the pair of food and 
transportation and communication services. 
In Table 3, the uncompensated (Marshallian) and expenditure elastici-
ties are reported. Given that all own-price elasticities are negative, the 
Marshallian demand functions for all commodity groups are downward slop-
ing. This indicates that all commodities were found to behave as normal 
goods. Moreover, all commodities, except medical care and transportation-
communication services, were found to have an inelastic demand; that for 
TABLE 3 
U N C O M P E N S A T E D P R I C E A N D E X P E N D I T U R E E L A S T I C I T I E S , G R E E C E , 1960-1991 
P r i c e o f C o m m o d i t y 
Commodity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Food -0.239 0.013 -0.266 -0.105 -0.008 -0.055 0.009 0.017 
2. Beverages and 
Tobacco 
-0.074 -0.434 -0.003 -0.178 -0.397 -0.033 -0.461 0.548 
3. Clothing and 
Footwear 
-1.130 -0.013 -0.380 0.282 0.142 0.169 0.365 -0.628 
4. Housing -0.400 -0.082 0.253 -0.320 -0.034 -0.013 -0.143 -0.196 
5. Durables -0.157 -0.305 0.196 -0.060 -0.474 0.220 -0.110 -0.318 
6. Medical care -0.783 -0.076 0.443 -0.095 0.454 -1.630 0.527 -0.154 
7. Transportation 
& Communication 
-0.258 -0.329 0.352 -0.253 -0.128 0.197 -1.010 -0.017 
8. Others -0.277 0.260 -0.571 -0.283 -0.259 -0.056 -0.014 -0.310 
Expenditure 
Elasticities 
0.633 1.031 1.193 0.930 1.004 1.340 1.445 1.511 
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food was found the most inelastic. On the other hand, medical care was 
found with the most sensitive demand function. In contrast, Mergos and 
Donatos (1989) found that housing had the most inelastic demand followed 
by housing durables. Their estimates, however, were obtained without simul-
taneously imposing the restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity. In com-
parison with other countries, the own-price Marshallian elasticities for food, 
beverages and tobacco, and clothing and footwear were higher in Greece 
than in U.S. However, they were lower than those reported for U.K. and 
Canada. Although we found lower elasticity estimates for housing and house 
durables than in the above mentioned countries, the opposite is true for 
transportation and communication services. 
The expenditure elasticities are all positive and thus, the possibility of 
an inferior commodity is eliminated. Moreover it is interesting to note that 
TABLE 4 
MARSHALLIAN OWN-PRICE AND EXPENDITURE ELASTICITIES 
FOR DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
Commodi ty U.K. U.S.A India** Canada Greece 
1954-1980 1948-1978 1952-1969 1947-1979 1960-1991 
1. Food -0.52 (0.21) -0.21 (0.43) -0.42 (0.35) -0.63* (0.72) -0.24 (0.63) 
2. Beverages 
& Tobacco 
-0.67 (0.53) -0.08 (0.22) -0.43 (1.03) 
3. Clothing 
& footwear 
-0.42 (1.18) -0.24 (0.58) -1.78 (2.30) -0.96 (0.21) -0.38 (1.19) 
4. Housing -0.55 (1.41) -0.57 (1.57) -0.32 (0.43) 
5.Fuel-Light -0.11 (1.83) -0.38 (1.17) -0.70 (0.57) -0.90 (1.26) 
6. Durables -0.33 (1.84) -0.52 (1.39) -0.47 (1.00) 
7. Misc. 
Goods 
-0.37 (0.82) -0.22 (0.62) -0.95 (2.21) -0.90 (1.45) -0.31 (1.51) 
8. Misc. 
S e r v i c e s 




-0.80 (1.08) -0.38 (1.09) -0.82 (1.25) -1.01 (1.45) 
10. Medical 
Care 
-0.61 (1.99) -1.63 (1.34) 
The numbers in parentheses represent expenditure elasticities. 
* Included Food, Beverages and Tobacco. 
** Urban areas. 
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two income elasticities (that of beverages and tobacco and housing durables) 
are almost equal to one. In terms of income sensitivity, medical care and 
transportation and communication services were found to be the most elastic 
whereas food is the least elastic. Food and housing are the only expenditure 
inelastic commodity categories as suggested by Engel's and Schwabe's laws, 
respectively (Brown and Deaton, 1972). Similar results were also obtained 
by Mergos and Donatos (1989). Food expenditure elasticity in Greece is 
higher than both U.K. (0.21) and U.S.A. (0.43) whereas the opposite is true 
for housing and house durables (see Table 4). For clothing and footwear, 
U.K. and Greece have similar expenditure elasticities, which are by far 
higher than those of the U.S. and Canada. Finally, the estimates for 
transportation and communication services as well as medical care are quite 
similar in Greece, U.K., U.S.A., and Canada. 
The decomposition results are reported in Table 5. The expenditure 
TABLE 5 
D E C O M P O S I T I O N A N A L Y S I S O F E Q U I L I B R I U M E X P E N D I T U R E S H A R E S , 
G R E E C E , 1960-1991 
Annual Observed Total Price 
Change in (Substitution) Budget 
Commodi ty Expenditure Share Effect Effect 
1. Food -0.0109 0.0054 -0.0163 
(100%) (-49.54%) (149.54%) 
2. Beverages and 0.0059 0.0045 0.0014 
Tobacco (100%) (76.27%) (23.73%) 
3. Clothing and -0.0038 -0.0124 0.0086 
Footwear (100%) (326.31%) (-226.31) 
4. Housing -0.0052 -0.0021 -0.0031 
(100%) (40.38%) (59.62%) 
5. Durables 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 
(100%) (50.00%) (50.00%) 
6. Medical care -0.0007 -0.0158 0.0151 
(100%) (2257.14%) (-2157.14%) 
7. Transportat ion 0.0307 0.0109 0.0198 
& Communication (100%) (35.50%) (64.50%) 
8. Others 0.0193 -0.0034 0.0227 
(100%) (-17.62%) (117.62%) 
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shares of food, clothing and footwear, housing, and medical care exhibited 
an annual rate of decrease of 1.1%, 0.4%, 0.5% and 0.1%, respectively. 
In contrast, the expenditure shares of beverages and tobacco, house dura-
bles, and transportation and communication services increased annually by 
0.6%, 0.04% and 3.1%, respectively. Thus, expenditure shares changed at 
really slow rates during the period from 1960 to 1980 except those of 
transportation and communication services and food. We faced a tremen-
dous annual increase of the former and a steady, slow decrease of the latter. 
There are four cases where the total price and the budget effect have 
moved in the same direction and simultaneously have determined a change 
in the corresponding expenditure share. This is true for beverages and 
tobacco, housing, housing durables and transportation and communication 
services. In two out of four cases (housing, and transportation-communica-
tion), the contribution of the budget effect is relatively stronger than that of 
the total price effect. On the other hand for both, clothing-footwear, and 
medical care, the total price and the budget effects have moved in the 
opposite direction to each other. In both cases, however, the total price 
effect was stronger and determined the direction of change of the correspond-
ing expenditure shares. 
According to our results, the decrease in the expenditure share of food 
was mainly due to the budget effect. This means that as autonomous 
changes in total expenditure occurred, Greek consumers preferred to de-
crease expenditure for food both in absolute .and relative terms. This 
consequently resulted in a decrease of the food expenditure share. In 
contrast, the total price (substitution) effect was positive and favored the 
increase of food expenditure shares. In relative terms, the price of food had 
become cheaper although the budget effect was strong enough to offset the 
positive total price effect. 
Almost three-quarters of the annual increase in the expenditure share 
of beverages and tobacco can be explained by the total substitution effect, 
which was positive. This means that its relative price decreased even in the 
presence of taxes in cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. Thus, commodity 
price changes seem to be more important for this commodity category than 
changes in total expenditures during the period under question. However, it 
should be mentioned that both effects have favoured the increase of its 
expenditure shares. 
In the case of clothing and footwear, the situation was different: 
changes in total spending favored the increase of its share, but prices tried 
to remove this trend. The relative price of clothing and footwear has in-
creased, and this induced a decrease of its share in total expenditure. More-
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over, this decrease could not be offset by the positive budget effect. 
The budget effect was the main contribution of the observed decrease 
in housing expenditure share. The total price (substitution) effect moved in 
the same direction and contributed for around 40% in this change. Thus, 
the relative price of housing services increased during the period under 
question, and Greek consumers allocated less and less of their autonomous 
changes in total spending to housing services. 
In contrast, the expenditure share of house durables increased. This 
increase is equally shared by the total price and the budget effect. Thus, 
both relative price and total expenditure changes favored the increase of 
house durables. Greek consumers reallocated the expenditures for housing 
and its equipment in favor of the latter. They preferred to spend less for 
housing, but they tried to improve the environment they lived in and ex-
panded the facilities provided by house durables. This can be considered as 
one of the most interesting features of the period under consideration. 
Surprisingly, Greek consumers' expenditure share for medical care was 
reduced mainly due to price changes. The relative price of medical care 
services increased, and this change was strong enough to offset the positive 
expenditure effect associated with it. Thus, even though there was a trend 
for increasing medical care services as changes in total spending occurred, 
the simultaneous increase in the price of these services did not allow for á 
reallocation of spending in favor of medical care. 
The tremendous annual increase of the transportation and communica-
tion expenditure share was mainly due to the budget effect which accounted 
for almost two-thirds of this change. The rest was attributed to the total 
price (substitution) effect. The relative price of transportation and communi-
cation services was reduced. Also much of the change in the total spending 
was allocated to these services. This phenomenon also occurred in other 
developed and developing countries, and it was related to changes in the 
quality of transportation and communication services as well as to the 
overall economic growth. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
During the period from 1960 to 1991, Greek consumption patterns 
were characterized by divergent paths of changes: the expenditure shares of 
food, clothing and footwear, housing and medical care declined while those 
of all other commodity categories considered in this study increased. More 
interestingly, the relative contribution of the price and the budget effect on 
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these changes are differentiated across commodity groups. Furthermore, 
both effects did not always have the same direction. The magnitude of the 
relative contribution of each one depends on the magnitude of the observed 
change in the exogenous variables (commodity prices and expenditures) 
and the demand sensitivity on those changes (i.e. elasticities). 
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VARIAZIONI NEI MODELLI DI CONSUMO IN GRECIA: IL RUOLO DEI 
PREZZI DELLE MERCI E DELLA SPESA DI BILANCIO 
Questo articolo presenta delle misure quantitative degli effetti di reddito e 
di sostituzione totale per otto gruppi merceologici. Queste misure sono state cal-
colate per la Grecia dal 1960 al 1990. Secondo i risultati dell'articolo entrambi 
questi effetti sono significativi nel determinare le variazioni nel tempo delle quo-
te di spesa. Inoltre, essi non hanno sempre la stessa direzione. Per vitto, allog-
gio e servizi di trasporto e comunicazione l'effetto di reddito sembra essere relati-
vamente più forte mentre per bibite, tabacco, abbigliamento e calzature, beni du-
revoli per la casa e cure mediche sono soprattutto le variazioni dei prezzi che de-
terminano i cambiamenti delle quote di spesa. 
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 42 (1995), N. 5, 421-427 
LA R I P A R T I Z I O N E D E L M E R C A T O FRA M A R C H E R I V A L I 
di 
CARLO CARLI * 
1. Il problema 
È universalmente affermato da parte dei marketing manager, e segnata-
mente da coloro che operano nei settori « consumer », come il volume delle 
vendite dipenda principalmente dai classici quattro fattori che compongono 
ciò che in gergo viene definito « marketing-mix »: il prodotto, il prezzo, la 
pubblicità (con la promozione ad essa assimilabile), la distribuzione. 
Tuttavia va notato come l'affermazione suddetta non vada oltre la 
dichiarazione di un generico rapporto fra causa ed effetto, astenendosi dal-
l'indicare il tipo di funzione interpretativa ed esplicativa, il grado di precisio-
ne e di significatività, le misure delle variabili in gioco. 
Il problema che si è voluto affrontare è proprio quello di definire un 
modello matematico-statistico in grado di rispondere a due quesiti principali 
circa la ripartizione del mercato fra marche rivali: 
a) quali risultati di vendita si possono conseguire impiegando prefis-
sate dosi di fattori di marketing? 
b) quali dosi di fattori si debbono mettere in campo dovendo conse-
guire prefissati obiettivi di vendita? 
2. La soluzione del problema 
È stato accertato, dopo controllati esperimenti condotti in molti settori 
« consumer », che la funzione statistica in grado di spiegare la relazione fra i 
fattori del marketing-mix e le vendite è una regressione multipla lineare, 
avente un coefficiente di correlazione mediamente pari a 0.94. 
* Università degli Studi di Parma, Laboratorio di Marketing, Parma. 
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La funzione assume la seguente connotazione: 
QM = a * BS + b * IC + c * PR -f d * QD + e * QP + k 
i cui simboli posseggono i significati sotto elencati. 
QM = Quote di mercato di marca, intese come rapporto percentuale fra le 
quantità vendute da una data marca e quelle vendute da tutte le 
marche operanti sul mercato. 
BS = Budget di settore, ottenuto sommando i budget pubblicitari di tutte 
le marche rivali. È chiaro come tale fattore debba essere espresso in 
lire costanti. 
IC = Indice di concentrazione del settore, calcolato sommando le tre 
maggiori quote di mercato. Evidentemente si tratta di un valore 
percentuale. 
PR = Prezzo relativo di marca, calcolato rapportando al prezzo medio del 
_ m ercato - posto uguale a cento - il prezzo di ciascuna marca. 
QD - Quota distributiva ponderata, quale rapporto percentuale fra il giro 
d'affari (di quel dato prodotto) nei punti di vendita in cui è presente 
quella data marca e l'intero giro d'affari (sempre di quel dato prodot-
to) in tutti i punti di vendita. 
QP = Quota pubblicitaria di marca, ricavata rapportando - percentual-
mente - il budget di ogni marca dall'intero budget di settore. 
k = Termine stocastico. 
a, b, c, d, e = coefficienti della regressione. 
I settori merceologici in cui sono state ricercate e reperite le funzioni di 
regressione multipla lineare del tipo suddetto (e intorno ai quali si sono 
sviluppati i processi di simulazione) sono circa una trentina. Nel prospetto 
seguente essi sono elencati con a fianco l'indicazione del corrispondente 
coefficiente di correlazione multipla lineare \ 
' La funzione, vagliata ai test di significatività, presenta i valori di F sempre decisamente 
superiori a. limiti critici più elevati (99%), ovviamente se le serie dei dati superano un minimo 
di numerosità (20-25). Anche i valori di t si dimostrano sempre superiori ai limiti critici più 
elevati se riferiti ai coefficienti relativi alle variabili di marca (prezzo relativo, quota pubblicita-
ria, quota distributiva ponderata), mentre per i due coefficienti di settore (budget di settore 
indice di concentrazione) i valori di t superano i limiti critici suddetti soltanto quando le serie 
dei dati trattati abbracciano un ampio arco di tempo (anni o bimestri) e presentano una 
congrua variabilità. 
La funzione logistica è risultata quella che meglio descrive le relazioni fra le coppie delle 
variabili di marca: QP e QD, QP e QM, QD e QM. Anche questa funzione, al vaglio dei test 
di significatività, presenta valori di R e di F sempre superiori ai valori critici più elevati (99%) 
Le relazioni fra la variabile prezzo e le altre variabili di marca sono invece descritte da funzioni 
di diversa forma, anche se prevalentemente di tipo lineare e di varia significatività 
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Settore C.C.M. Settore C.C.M. Settore C.C.M. 
Abbronzanti 0,98 Fuori pasto 0,96 Precucinati 0,95 
Balsami per capelli 0,89 Gelati in vaschetta 0,99 Preparati per budini 0,85 
Brandy 0,93 Insetticidi (piastrine) 0,89 Prosciutto cotto 0,98 
Caffè 0,94 Latte UHT 0,97 Prosciutto crudo 1,00 
Camomilla 0,95 Olio oliva e.v. 0,91 Riso 0,90 
Dadi per brodo 0,97 Olio oliva normale 0,84 Shampoo 0,87 
Dentifrici 0,94 Pannolini bambini 0,98 Succhi frutta 0,96 
Detersivi concentrati 0,83 Passate pomodoro 0,90 Tè 0,98 
Detersivi normali 0,95 Pesci surgelati 0,99 Vegetali surgelati 0,96 
Formaggio grana 1,00 Petfood 0,96 Whisky 0,92 
Frollini 0,96 
Può essere interessante sapere come si è pervenuti alla identificazione 
della funzione suddetta. Il tutto ha preso l'avvio nel periodo a cavallo degli 
anni 70-80, allorché il trattamento di 705 coppie di dati, analogo a quello 
effettuato negli USA da Peckham (1969), permise di accertare una prima 
relazione fra quote pubblicitarie e quote di mercato. 
Detta relazione è costituita da una semplice funzione logistica avente -
mediamente - un coefficiente di correlazione non inferiore a 0.80. 
Inoltre gli esperimenti suddetti permisero d'accertare che il rapporto 
tra quote pubblicitarie e quote di mercato « QP/QM » (in cui le QM sono 
riferite a quantità) risente in modo significativo dell'influenza di due fattori 
ambientali: la reclamizzazione (BS) e la concentrazione (IC) del settore. 
Ciò nel senso che nei settori molto reclamizzati e molto concentrati 
l'intercetta e l'asintoto si allontanano, mentre nei settori poco reclamizzati e 
poco concentrati si verifica esattamente l'opposto dando origine, rispettiva-
mente, a curve molto ripide e a curve di limitata pendenza. 
Giunti a questo punto è sorta spontanea la ricerca di una funzione 
avente un più elevato coefficiente di correlazione, attraverso l'inclusione fra 
le variabili indipendenti di due altri importanti fattori: la quota distributiva 
(QD) e il prezzo relativo (PR) in aggiunta a tutti i fattori (di marca e di 
ambiente) sin qui citati. Si è pervenuti così alla determinazione della funzio-
ne di regressione multipla lineare più sopra illustrata. 
È pure interessante sapere che anche altri ricercatori si sono posti alla 
ricerca di una funzione esplicativa fra fattori del marketing mix e le vendite, 
percorrendo strade molto simili e conseguendo risultati analoghi a quelli più 
sopra messi in evidenza (Carli e Zaghi, 1994). 
A questo punto appare superfluo far osservare come utilizzando la 
funzione di regressione multipla lineare è possibile definire, mediante tentati-
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vi sistematici, gli effetti (cioè le QM) ottenibili con variabili dosi e variabili 
combinazioni di fattori del marketing-mix. 
3. Fonti e trattamento dei dati 
Le fonti dei dati utilizzati sono costituite dalle normali rilevazioni di 
shop-audit della Nielsen e dai servizi di censimento pubblicitario della stessa 
società (servizio NASA). 
È bene osservare che i dati suddetti sono, di norma, abitualmente in 
possesso delle imprese operanti nei diversi settori, grazie a un diffuso con-
tratto di abbonamento. 
Tali dati sono stati ovviamente oggetto di appropriati trattamenti, sud-
divisi nelle tre principali fasi sotto descritte: 
a) preliminare, finalizzato alla costruzione delle matrici di base; 
b) statistico, finalizzato alla identificazione di funzioni e di corre-
lazioni; 
c) simulazioni, finalizzato alla formulazione di previsioni sull'esito di 
ipotizzate combinazioni dei fattori del marketing mix. 
Il trattamento preliminare dei dati comprende un normale processo di 
deflazionamento e di destagionalizzazione dei valori monetari che attengono 
al! area pubblicitaria e la loro trasformazione in dati percentuali, nonché la 
trasformazione dei prezzi assoluti in prezzi relativi. 
Il trattamento si conclude con la costruzione di tre matrici di dati: la 
prima che comprende anche l'aggregato costituito dalle « Altre Marche »; la 
seconda che esclude, di norma, detto aggregato e i dati delle marche in 
lancio; la terza in cui sono comprese, per tutti i periodi esaminati, soltanto 
le quote di mercato delle singole marche e delle Altre Marche con i rispettivi 
budget di settore (BS). 
Ovviamente si auspica che l'aggregato delle Altre Marche possa essere 
fornito dall'attuale società rilevatrice suddiviso in tre gruppi (specialmente a 
proposito della QD): altre marche industriali, altre marche commerciali, 
budget brands. 
Il trattamento statistico riguarda sostanzialmente le due ultime matrici: 
la seconda, dedicata al calcolo delle funzioni che legano le singole variabili 
sia fra loro sia con le vendite; la terza, dedicata al calcolo delle correlazioni 
fra le QM delle marche concorrenti e la relazione fra BS e la QM delle Altre 
Marche. 
Le simulazioni non sono altro che applicazioni delle funzioni di regres-
sione multipla lineare attribuendo alle variabili indipendenti gamme di vaio-
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ri opportunamente scelti. In altre parole si calcolano le quote di mercato che 
si possono ottenere variando opportunamente la combinazione dei fattori di 
marketing di marca (segnatamente il prezzo e il budget pubblicitario) e 
d'ambiente. 
È chiaro che nel far ciò si risponde ai quesiti sub a) e sub b) del primo 
paragrafo, come dovevasi dimostrare. 
Sembra superfluo informare che l'effettuazione dei trattamenti suddetti 
diviene abbastanza agevole mediante un particolare software — denominato 
Marketing-Mix — appositamente realizzato dallo scrivente in cooperazione 
col dott. Alberto Zaghi, matematico e informatico collaboratore del Labora-
torio di Marketing di Parma (Carli e Zaghi, 1994). 
4. Analisi critica 
Il modello sopra descritto non è certamente completo e non è certamen-
te immune da critiche. Tuttavia esso costituisce quanto è consentito dall'at-
tuale disponibilità dei dati e dalle elaborazioni conseguenti. Fra le non 
poche critiche devono essere citate, in modo particolare, quelle riguardanti i 
temi seguenti. 
La qualità del prodotto : per qualità del prodotto si deve intendere 
quella soggettivamente intesa (percepita o attribuita). Tale dato manca dalla 
funzione poiché non è ancora oggetto di syndicate survey analoghe agli 
shop-audit. 
Gli effetti della pubblicità-, attualmente nella funzione sono immessi 
dati sugli investimenti pubblicitari che lamentano evidenti lacune. Per esem-
pio: il limitato paniere dei media analizzati; i prezzi di listino della pubblici-
tà variamente distanti da quelli praticati; la qualità della pubblicità; gli 
errori di pianificazione dei media e di programmazione temporale; la cumula-
zione degli effetti delle campagne pubblicitarie pregresse; le promozioni e le 
sponsorizzazioni. 
Per colmare le lacune suddette basterebbe rilevare periodicamente — 
mediante apposita syndicate survey — il dato riguardante la notorietà-immagi-
ne delle diverse marche. Infatti tale dato consentirebbe di superare le lacune 
elencate poiché in esso si riassume l'effetto finale delle campagne pubblicita-
rie comunque eseguite. 
La regressione multipla lineare : allo stato presente delle esperienze que-
sta funzione si è dimostrata adatta, ma è probabile che una vasta disponibili-
tà di dati storici possa condurre a una più idonea regressione multipla di 
tipo non lineare. 
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Occorre infine informare che lo scrivente ha messo a punto un modello 
di rilevazione syndicate survey concernente la qualità del prodotto e la noto-
rietà delle marche, attraverso una congrua sperimentazione dall'esito confor-
tante. È chiaro che la sua implementazione dipende dal finanziamento da 
parte delle imprese, che a sua volta dipende dal grado di convincimento dei 
rispettivi marketing manager circa la possibilità di definire le politiche di 
marketing attraverso precisi calcoli razionali. 
Inoltre si può utilizzare il modello di Goodman (impiegato per accerta-
re i flussi degli elettori fra i partiti, trattando i risultati aggregati di due 
successive votazioni) per definire i flussi dei consumatori fra marche concor-
renti (Carli e Zaghi, 1994). Cosa questa ora possibile soltanto mediante le 
rilevazioni riguardanti i consumatori. 
5. Conclusioni 
La ripartizione del mercato fra marche rivali è il risultato delle politi-
che di marketing messe in atto dalle singole imprese che si contendono i 
consumatori. A loro volta le singole politiche di marketing altro non sono 
che l'implementazione di quelle combinazioni dei fattori del marketing-mix 
decise da ciascun manager che le ha ritenute ottimali. 
Lo strumento razionale che consente al marketing manager di definire 
il marketing mix ottimale, come illustrato in precedenza, è costituito dai 
calcoli (simulazioni) basati sulla regressione lineare multipla. 
I dati necessari per i calcoli sopra richiamati non presentano alcun 
costo aggiuntivo per le imprese, in quanto rientranti nelle normali forniture 
in abbonamento. Vi saranno certamente costi aggiuntivi in connessione alle 
rilevazioni periodiche sulla qualità del prodotto e sulla notorietà-immagine 
delle marche. 
Lo strumento suddetto può considerarsi validato in forza delle seguenti 
argomentazioni: 
a) il confronto fra dati calcolati con la funzione interpolante e i dati 
rilevati dimostra un felice adattamento. E ciò vale per le serie dei dati 
interpolati e per le serie dei dati estrapolati; 
b) le applicazioni operative sin qui svolte hanno dimostrato la corret-
tezza dei dati simulati. In particolare si segnala la correttezza della definizio-
ne sia dei prezzi sia del budget pubblicitario. 
Occorre peraltro informare che il modello descritto non trova un'entu-
siastica accoglienza presso la generalità dei manager, sia perché essi non 
ritengono possibile definire in modo razionale ciò che è sempre stato affida-
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to all'arte e all'esperienza individuale degli operatori, sia perché probabilmen-
te temono una diminutio capitis. 
Ad ogni buon conto occorre ricordare come il proseguimento degli 
studi potrebbe portare a risultati migliori di quelli già acquisiti, soprattutto 
se potranno fondarsi su una più estesa e più completa serie di dati di 
mercato. 
RIFERIMENTI BIBLIOGRAFICI 
CARLI C. e ZAGHI A., Il modello Marketing-Mix, Parma: Ediprima-Azzali, 1994. 
PECKHAM James O., « Can we Relate Advertising Dollars to Market Share Objectives? », in 
M.A. McNiven, ed., How Much to Spend in Advertising?, New York: A.N.A., 1969. 
MARKET BREAKDOWN AMONG RIVAL BRANDS 
We have found that in consumer mass markets there exists a precise rela-
tionship between elements of the marketing mix and market shares. This rela-
tionship consists of a multiple linear regression having a correlation coefficient of 
0.95 on the average. Such a function has been experimented positively in all 30 
consumer fields where it was tested. 
The data used were those of "Nielsen Retail Index", and these are easily 
available in marketing oriented firms. 
On the basis of these data and functions it was possible to create a sofware 
(called Marketing-Mix) which enables us to perform many "simulations" aimed 
at finding the best combinations of those elements when making up a marketing 
mix and giving firms the possibility to attain greater market shares or simply 
more convenient ones. This software is extremely easy to use and becomes a tool 
for marketers after only a very short training period (a few hours). 
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R E L A Z I O N I D I B I L A N C I O 
FONSPA BILANCIO 1994 
Si è tenuta a Roma, gio-
vedì 20 aprile, l'Assemblea 
degli Azionisti del Credito 
Fondiario e Industriale -
FONSPA - Spa, che ha 
approvato il Bilancio al 
31 dicembre 1994. 
Il passa to esercizio è 
stato caratterizzato da 
una difficile situazione 
di mercato, in particola-
re nel settore immobiliare, 
che ha comportato il perdurare di una debole 
d o m a n d a di f inanz iament i e, da par te 
dell'Istituto, un'attenta politica di selezione e 
controllo dei rischi creditizi. 
Sono state stipulate nuove operazioni per 
1.480,8 miliardi (1.636,1 miliardi nel 1993). 
A fine esercizio i crediti verso la clientela 
erano pari a 11.781,0 miliardi (+1,7% rispetto 
alla fine del '93). 
Il margine di interesse è stato pari a 311,2 
miliardi (-7,7% rispetto al '93), in relazione 
sia alla riduzione degli spreads che alla con-
tenuta dinamica degli impieghi. 
E' stata ulteriormente accentuata la pruden-
ziale politica negli accantonamenti a fronte 
dei rischi creditizi, che hanno inciso sul 
conto economico per 214,8 miliardi, contro i 
185,4 del 1993. 
In par t icolare , ol t re ad avere e f f e t tua to 
accantonamenti in sospensione di imposta 
nella misura massima consentita, è stato 
effettuato un ulteriore accantonamento sup-
plementare tassato. 
L'utile prima delle imposte è risultato pari a 
39,3 miliardi (84,5 miliardi nel precedente 
esercizio).L'utile netto è stato di 13,4 miliardi 
(32,1 miliardi nel 1993). Verrà distribuito un 
dividendo di 100 lire per azione, a fronte 
delle 200 lire del 1993; lo stesso sarà pagabi-
le a partire dal 18 maggio 1995, su presenta-
zione dei certificati azionari, 
ai sensi delle disposizio-
ni di legge, presso la 
Banca Commerc ia l e 
I ta l iana, il Cred i to 
I tal iano, la Banca di 
Roma e le al tre con-
suete Casse incaricate, 
nonché p resso la Monte -
Titoli Spa (per i titoli dalla stessa ammini-
strati) e la Sede sociale dell'Istituto. 
L'Assemblea ha provveduto altresì ad inte-
grare IConsiglio di Amministrazione nomi-
nando consigliere il sig. Antonio Masala, già 
cooptato nel corso del 1994. 
Il Consiglio di Amministrazione ha poi confer-
mato nella carica di Presidente Mario Piovano. 
Amministratore Delegato è Antonio Masala. 
FONSPA - Consistenza finanziamenti a Une periodo 
(importi In millanti di lire) 
1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 
La documentaz ione d i cui alla delibera CONSOB 
n. 5553 del 14.11.1991 è deposi tata presso la Sede 
sociale, Via Cr is toforo Colombo, 80 e p resso il 
Consiglio di Borsa di Milano e le al tre Sedi. 
C o p i a della s tessa ve r rà invia ta a c h i u n q u e ne 
faccia richiesta. 
CREDITO FONDIARIO 
E INDUSTRIALE s.p.A. 
ISTITUTO PER i ^ H A MEDIO E ItlNGO TERMINE 
FON 
SPA 
Sede in Rom» - 00147 - Via Cristoforo Colombo, 80 
Filiale di Milano - 20149 VlaVlttoria Colonna, 4 
Capitale Sodale: LIOO.OOOMOOO; 
Riserve L. 605.086.737.725 
Fondo rischi bancari generali L. 144.525.000.000 
Registro Sodetà n.127/26 CancelleriaTribunale di Roma 
4 3 0 RELAZIONI DI BILANCIO 
ISTITUTO CENTRALE DI BANCHE E BANCHIERI 
S e d e Sociale e Direzione Genera le : Milano, Corso Monfor te , 34 






Cassa e disponibilità 
presso banche centra-
li e uffici postali 
Titoli del Tesoro e va-
lori assimilati ammis-
sibili al rifinanziamen-
to presso banche cen-
trali 
Crediti verso banche: 
a) a vista 
b) altri crediti 
Crediti verso clientela 
Obbligazioni e altri tito-







a) di emittenti pubblici 1.471.806.456.111 
b) di banche 129.893.835.674 
c) di enti finanziari 2.252.250 








Azioni, quote e altri ti-
toli di capitale 
Partecipazioni 
Partecipazioni in impre-









Ratei e risconti attivi: 
a) ratei attivi 





10. Debiti verso banche: 
a) a vista 456.246.936.115 














20. Debiti verso clientela 
a) a vista 69.192.065.536 
b) a termine o con preav-
viso 10.096.900.175 
30. Debiti rappresentati da 
titoli: 
a) altri titoli 126.396.818.118 
50. Altre passività 
60. Ratei e risconti passivi: 
a) ratei passivi 
b) risconti passivi 
84.291.019.499 
79.015.356 
70. Trattamento di fine rap-
porto di lavoro subor-
dinato 
80. Fondi per rischi ed o-
neri: 
b) fondi imposte e tasse 20.084.703.981 
c) altri fondi 1.150.000.000 
Totale dell'Attivo 5.283.863.351.683 
100. Fondo per rischi ban-
cari generali 
120. Capitale 
130. Sovrapprezzi di emis-
sione 
140. Riserve: 
a) riserva legale 
b) riserva per azioni o 
quote proprie 
d) altre riserve 
150. Riserve di rivalutazione 
170. Utile d'esercizio 

















Garanzie e impegni 
10. Garanzie Rilasciate 
di cui: 
— accettazioni 






Istituto Italiano di Credito Fondiario 
SOCIETÀ PER AZIONI - SEDE IN ROMA - CAPITALE L. 108.000.000.000 
BILANCIO D'IMPRESA - STATO PATRIMONIALE AL 31 DICEMBRE 1994 
ATTIVO 
Lire 
10. Cassa e disponibilità 
presso banche centra-
li e uffici postali 
20. Titoli del Tesoro e va-
lori assimilati ammis-
sibili al rifinanziamen-
to presso banche cen-
trali 
30. Crediti verso banche: 
a) a vista 
b) altri crediti 
40. Crediti verso clientela 
50. Obbligazioni e altri tito-
li di debito: 
a) di emittenti pubblici 
b) di banche 
di cui: 
— titoli propri 
70. Partecipazioni 
di cui: 
— valutate al patrimo-
nio netto 
— altre 
80. Partecipazioni in impre-
se del gruppo 
di cui: 






130. Altre attività 
140. Ratei e risconti attivi: 
a) ratei attivi 
b) risconti attivi 
di cui: 
— disaggio di emissio-

























10. Debiti verso banche: 
a) a vista 










20. Debiti verso clientela 
a) a vista 









Debiti rappresentati da 
titoli: 
a) obbligazioni 6.079.616.868.521 
b) certificati di deposito 155.230.000.000 
c) altri titoli 269.213.948.727 
Totale dell'Attivo 9.350.087.946.605 
Fondi di terzi in ammi-
nistrazione 
Altre passività 
Ratei e risconti passivi: 
a) ratei passivi 
b) risconti passivi 
Trattamento di fine rap-
porto di lavoro subor-
dinato 
Fondi per rischi ed o-
neri: 
a) fondi di quiescenza e 
per obblighi simili 
b) fondi imposte e tasse 
c) altri fondi 
Fondi rischi su crediti 




a) riserva legale 
b) riserva per azioni o 
quote proprie 
c) riserva statutaria 
d) altre riserve 
Riserve di rivalutazione 
Utile d'esercizio 





















Gsranzie e impegni 
20. Impegni 1.702.873.790.283 
Fondazione Marco Fodella 
Via Meravigli 18 
20123 Milano 
C.F. 97164850154 
Borse di studio della Fondazione Marco Fodella 
Allo scopo di promuovere la conoscenza della musica antica la Fondazione Marco Fodella 
(*) istituisce borse di studio per i corsi di liuto, altri strumenti e canto offerti dalla Sezione 
Musica Antica della Civica Scuola di Musica di Milano. 
Tali corsi (con i rispettivi docenti) sono: Arpa (Mara Galassi), Canto (Cristina Miatello), 
Clavicembalo e Fortepiano (Laura Alvini), Flauto diritto (Pedro Memelsdorff), Flauto 
traverso (Ezequiel Recondo), Liuto (Paul Beier), Oboe barocco (Paolo Grazzi), Organo 
barocco (Lorenzo Ghielmi), Tromba naturale (Gabriele Cassone), Viola da gamba e 
Violoncello barocco (Roberto Gini), Violino barocco (Enrico Gatti e Donella Terenzio), 
Violone (Paolo Rizzi). 
Le borse di studio (una delle quali è vincolata allo strumento di Marco, il liuto) consistono in: 
1) iscrizione alla Civica Scuola di Musica 
2) alloggio in Milano. 
Per informazioni dettagliate e la presentazione delle domande (da far pervenire entro il 31 
marzo 1996) rivolgersi a: "Borse di studio della Fondazione Marco Fodella " 
c/o Civica Scuola di Musica di Milano, Sezione di Musica Antica, Villa Simonetta, Via 
Stilicone 36, 20154 Milano fax (02) 331 5697 tei 313 334 oppure 3310 1259 (ore 15-18) 
Concerti della Fondazione Marco Fodella 
Allo scopo di diffondere la conoscenza della musica antica la Fondazione Marco Fodella (*) 
annuncia i seguenti concerti che si terranno nella Basilica di San Marco, Sacrestia Monumentale 
(Milano, Piazza San Marco, 2): 
Giovedì 19 ottobre 1995 ore 21 "Allegrezza del nuovo maggio" 
musiche di Biagio Marini, Ensemble Galilei diretto da Paul Beier 
Emanuela Galli soprano 
Venerdì 20 ottobre 1995 ore 21 
recital di liuto: musiche di Gautier, Mouton, Weiss 
Franco Pavan liuto barocco 
Sabato 21 ottobre 1995 ore 21 
recital di liuto: musiche di Bach, Weiss, Logy, Reusner 
Anthony Bailes liuto barocco 
La Civica Scuola di Musica annuncia il concerto per ricordare Marco che verrà eseguito 
presso la propria sede nell'Auditorium di Villa Simonetta: 
Martedì 14 novembre 1995 ore 19 
(*) Fondazione Marco Fodella 
La Fondazione ha lo scopo di promuovere e continuare nel nome di Marco le attività culturali, 
sociali e umanitarie che ne hanno caratterizzato l'intensa vita. Tra queste: la conoscenza della 
musica antica attraverso l'erogazione di borse di studio per la Civica Scuola di Musica di 
Milano (Sezione di Musica Antica), l'organizzazione di concerti e manifestazioni culturali in 
genere, la cura e l'edizione di dischi e pubblicazioni specializzate, la promozione di studi e 
ricerche; l'attività di assistenza umanitaria; l'attività diretta ai giovani; e ogni altra iniziativa 
appropriata allo spirito che anima la Fondazione e idonea a perseguirne gli scopi. A questo 
fine si terrà particolarmente conto delle proposte formulate da chi abbia conosciuto e amato 
Marco o suggerite dalle caratteristiche della sua personalità. 
QUALCOSA CHE PARLA ANCHE QUANDO TUTTO E1 SILENZIO 
è qualcosa nel mondo delle telecomunicazioni che fa pensare ai grandi 
e ai grandi silenzi. Perché anche nel silenzio c ' è comunicazione, come 
.. ogni attimo della giornata. Gli strumenti di telecomunicazione, i satelliti, 
e reti, i moderni sistemi di t rasmissione aiutano la gente a capirsi di più. 
T Gruppo Stet è formato da oltre cento aziende che lavorano in tutti i settori 
Ielle te lecomunicazioni . Gest iscono i servizi , costruiscono gli impianti. 
installano le reti, aiutano migliaia di aziende in tutto il mondo a dialogare tramite 
sistemi avanzati di trasmissione dati e servizi di comunicazione via satellite. 
Nel Gruppo Stet operano anche aziende specializzate nel campo dell'editoria elet-
tronica, dell'informatica, del marketing, della comunicazione e dei nuovi servizi 
multimediali. Il Gruppo Stet è una grande realtà internazionale che lavora in 
Italia e in tutto il mondo per portare le telecomunicazioni verso nuove conquiste. 
ésTST 
T E L E C O M U N I C A Z I O N I 
I N I T A L I A E N E L M O N D O 
économie 
appliquée 
An international journal of 
economic analysis 
Tome XLVIII, N°2 - Juin 1995 
Sommaire 
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In base alla Legge 25 agosto 1991 n. 282, l'ENEA è l'Ente pubblico che ha 
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L'ENEA ha due compiti fondamentali: condurre attività di ricerca nei settori di 
sua competenza e svolgere la funzione di « agenzia » per la diffusione dei 
risultati di attività all'intero contesto nazionale. 
Le linee di intervento dell'ENEA prevedono in particolare: 
- ricerca, sviluppo e sperimentazione di tecnologie e impianti innovativi; 
trasferimento e diffusione dell'innovazione al sistema produttivo, industriale e 
agricolo; 
- sviluppo di tecnologie, impianti e componenti finalizzati all'utilizzo delle 
fonti rinnovabili e al risparmio energetico; realizzazione e sperimentazione di 
impianti dimostrativi; promozione della domanda; 
- ricerca e sperimentazione di reattori nucleari di tipo innovativo a 
maggiore sicurezza intrinseca o passiva; smantellamento degli impianti nuclea-
ri del ciclo del combustibile della passata generazione; 
- ricerche sulla fusione nucleare nel quadro di un'ampia collaborazione 
con le Comunità scientifiche nazionali e internazionali; 
- caratterizzazione dell'ambiente; ricerca e valutazione degli effetti sul-
l'ambiente e sull'uomo derivanti dalle attività produttive; sviluppo di tecnologie 
avanzate e di nuovi prodotti a basso impatto ambientale. 
L'Ente, che conta oltre 4.500 dipendenti, è presente in tutto il territorio 
nazionale con 9 grandi Centri di ricerca e altre più ridotte aree di attività. 
ENEA viale Regina Margherita 125, 00198 Roma 
Telefono 06/85281; telefax 06/85282591; telex 610183 ENEA I 
e tecnologie 
Una formula alla base del successo 
del Gruppo ENI. 
In Italia e nel mondo, al servizio dello 
sviluppo economico del Paese. 
« GRUPPO 
I 
